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INTRODUCTION
The debate about the desirability and efficacy of socially responsi-
ble investing (SRI) is about as old as the practice of investing itself.'
Indeed, in spite of a persistent inability on the part of all partici-
pants in the debate to develop a simple, coherent definition of what
is meant by socially responsible investing, 2 the debate continues.3
1. See ANNE SIMPSON, THE GREENING OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT: How THE ENVIRONMENT,
ETHICS, AND POLITICS ARE RESHAPING STRATEGIES 27 (1991) (summarizing history of ethical
investment in U.S. and noting that socially responsible investing can be traced back to 1928,
when ecclesiastical group established first ethical investment fund called Pioneer Fund). The
focus of these initial efforts was avoidance of "sin stocks," which was a term used to character-
ize investments in companies that produced liquor or tobacco or had a financial interest in
gambling. See MYRA ALPERSON ET AL., THE BETTER WORLD INVESTMENT GUIDE 2 (1991) (trac-
ing history of socially responsible investing to its genesis in religious investment movement).
Until the late 1960s, ethical investing drew scant interest outside the religious community. Id.
During the 1960s, however, a surge in SRI took place as a means of expressing opposition to
the Vietnam War, most visibly with the targeting of Dow Chemical Corporation by social
investors outraged by its production of napalm, an antipersonnel weapon used in the jungles
of Vietnam. Id.
2. There is no single accepted definition of SRI, although many efforts to define SRI
have been made. See, e.g., SEVERYN T. BRUYN, THE FIELD OF SOCIAL INVESTMENT 1 (1987)
(stating that socially responsible investments are designed to effect positive social change and
maintain economic returns); Matthew Bromberg, Social Investing: The Good Guys Finish First,
Bus. & Soc'y REV., Fall 1988, at 34 ("Any one definition of social responsibility will be highly
personal at best and hopelessly nebulous at worst, and usually fall somewhere in between.");
John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV.
72, 73, 83 (1980) (defining social investment as practice of avoiding investment in companies
deemed "socially irresponsible" and investing instead in socially laudable firms, but noting
that "[tihere is no consensus about which social principles to pursue and about which invest-
ments are consistent or inconsistent with these principles").
3. Some critics of socially responsible investing maintain that decisions based on social
criteria entail higher risks and the prospect of lower economic returns. See Langbein & Pos-
ner, supra note 2, at 85-94 (asserting that social investing yields increased portfolio risk and
lower net expected returns). Critics of SRI further assert that SRI is illegal. See, e.g.,John H.
Langbein, Social Investing of Pension Funds and University Endowments: Unprincipled, Futile, and
Illegal, in JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., DISINVESTMENT: Is IT LEGAL? IS IT MORAL? IS IT PRODUC-
TIVE? 16, 16-25 (1985) (charging that social investing of pension funds violates federal Em-
ployment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and fiduciary duty to manage
trust assets). Some critics believe it is more appropriate for the goals of social investing to be
pursued through the political process than through investment decisions by pension fund
trustees. See id. at 28 (stating that "trustees will best serve the cause of social change by
remitting the advocates of social causes to the political arena"). Yet despite these concerns,
SRI has continued to grow in importance. See RITCHIE P. LOWRY, GOOD MONEY: A GUIDE TO
PROFITABLE SOCIAL INVESTING IN THE '90S 19-31 (1991) (detailing history and development of
socially responsible investment in U.S.); "Social Investing". Pressure Grows to Pump Pension Money
into "Worthy" Causes, AARP BULL. (AARP, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 1990, at 17 (noting that
socially responsible pension fund investment is increasing). Moreover, techniques of SRI
have been well-established. See ALAN J. MILLER, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING: HOW TO
INVEST WITH YOUR CONSCIENCE 29-35 (1991) (describing avoidance, alternative, and activist
investment strategies); SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 1-7 (describing negative and positive screen-
ing techniques of socially responsible investing).
Proponents of SRI dispute that incorporation of socially responsible principles into invest-
ment strategy must come at a cost to the investor. See Bromberg, supra note 2, at 32 (main-
taining that because of "exceptional returns and widespread popularity" of select socially
responsible funds, "profit-seeking investors ... have unwittingly become the strongest propo-
nents of ethical investment strategies"); Stephen P. Ferris & Karl P. Rykaczcwski, Social Invest-
ment and the Management of Pension Portfolios, J. AM. Soc'v CLU & CHFC, Nov. 1986, at 60
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Many funds that purport to engage in SRI have surprisingly little in
common. 4 However, if a single political issue could be said to have
attracted the attention of virtually every socially responsible fund
currently in existence, it would have to be South Africa's abhorrent
practice of apartheid.5 Current political developments in that coun-
try6 and the abandonment of economic sanctions against the coun-
try by the United States, the European Community, Israel, and
others7 have ignited debate about the usefulness of punitive meas-
(stating that advocacy of socially responsible investing is premised on assumption that retire-
ment security can be pursued in conjunction with other objectives); South Africa-Free Portfolios
Don't Suffer, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Oct. 16, 1989, at 40 [hereinafter South Africa-Free
Portfolios] (surveying strong performance of mutual funds that restrict investment in South
Africa).
4. See infra notes 33, 37 and accompanying text (detailing wide variety of investment
objectives sought by different socially responsible mutual funds).
5. See SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE MUTUAL FUNDS 1-2 (May
1992) [hereinafter SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE MUTUAL FUNDS] (noting that major socially respon-
sible mutual funds using South African ties as litmus test to avoid corporate investment in-
clude: Calvert-Ariel Appreciation Fund, Calvert Social Investment Fund, Covenant
Investment Management, Domini Social Index Trust, Dreyfus Third Century, Green Century
Balanced Fund, New Alternatives, Parnassus Fund, Pax World Fund, and Rightime Social
Awareness Fund); see also ELIZABETH JUDD, INVESTING wrrH A SOCIAL CONSCIENCE 11 (1990)
("The range and possibilities for socially responsible investing were not tested until the issue
of exiting South Africa aroused a popular sentiment in the mid-1980s."); MILLER, supra note 3,
at 28 ("Before environmentalism leapt to the forefront as the crusade of the 1990s, the issue
of apartheid in South Africa was far and away the biggest concern of socially responsible
investors."); Bromberg, supra note 2, at 32 ("The proliferation of socially responsible funds in
the 1980s has in large part been a reaction to the passion of the movement to divest from
South Africa.").
6. The South African Government has given white parents a chance to desegregate
public schools by popular vote. If 80% of parents at a school vote on a desegregation initia-
tive and 72%o of those approve it, the school can enroll other races. See Christopher S. Wren,
South Africa Integrates Some Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at A3 (noting that one-tenth of
South Africa's public schools were desegregated by means of parental voting process for 1991
school year). In addition, the government of South Africa has repealed the Reservation of
Separate Amenities Act (Act No. 49 of 1953), the Black Land Act (Act No. 27 of 1913), the
Group Areas Act (Act No. 36 of 1966), and the Population Registration Act (Act No. 30 of
1950). The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, revoked by the Discriminatory Legislation
Regarding Public Amenities Act (Act No. 100 of 1991), had allowed municipalities to restrict
the use of public facilities to whites. The Black Land Act, which restricted black land owner-
ship to 13%6 of the country, was repealed by the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures
Act (Act No. 108 of 1991). Legally, blacks may now purchase property anywhere in South
Africa. The Group Areas Act, which was also repealed by the Abolition of Racially Based
Land Measures Act (Act No. 108 of 1991), had determined where people could live based on
their race. Another statute that was repealed, the Population Registration Act, revoked by the
Population Registration Repeal Act (Act No. 114 of 1991), had classified South Africans from
birth on the basis of race. The classification was the cornerstone of apartheid and determined
the privileges or hardships of each individual. See Christopher S. Wren, South Africa Scraps Law
Defining People by Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1991, at Al (describing repeal of Population
Registration Act, which was viewed as legal foundation of apartheid).
7. See Exec. Order No. 12,769, 3 C.F.R. 342 (1991) (invoking presidential authority
under Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Star. 1086 (codified at 22
U.S.C. §§ 5001-5117 (1988)), to terminate economic sanctions on South Africa). In spite of
the Bush administration's recent decision to lift sanctions against South Africa, many U.S.
companies have indicated that they do not intend to resume business activities in or with that
country at any time in the near future. See Businesses Avoid South Africa Ties, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
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ures as a means to prevent capital from finding its way to a variety of
otherwise attractive projects.8 Consequently, it is an appropriate
moment in which to assess the merits of social investment as both an
income-producing tool and an instrument for political coercion.
Professors John Langbein and Richard Posner posed an impor-
tant theoretical challenge to SRI by arguing that SRI through pen-
sion funds is prohibited by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 9 Langbein and Posner's analysis is
heavily dependent on modem portfolio theory,10 and in particular,
on the hypothesis that capital markets are efficient." This Article
argues that in light of increasing evidence developed in recent years
that capital markets do not always operate efficiently, 12 a pension
fund manager can maximize income by following a program of ethi-
cal investing.' 3
Part I of this Article contains a description of the mechanics of
social investing, as well as examples of some of the most common
"screens" used by socially responsible fund managers to avoid ob-
jectionable investment targets. The section also considers major
differences between socially responsible and traditional investing.
To the extent that capital markets are not efficient, a stronger eco-
1991, at Al (indicating that few U.S. businesses plan to invest in South Africa in immediate
wake of end of economic sanctions).
The European Community decided on April 15, 1991, to lift a ban on the importation of
South African gold coins, iron, and steel. Craig Whitney, Britain Backs End to South African
Sports Barriers, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 24, 1991, at A5. Similarly, Israel lifted economic and cultufal
sanctions against South Africa onJuly 15, 1991. Israel Lifts Sanctions on South Africa, Cui. TRin.,
July 15, 1991, at M5.
8. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (describing method of barring invest-
ment in certain companies presumed to be attractive but for their South African connection).
9. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 2, at 77-89 (concluding that socially responsible
investments entail higher risks because portfolio constructed in accordance with social princi-
pIes will be less diversified than portfolio constructed on principle of profit maximization).
The authors analyzed a socially responsible portfolio and demonstrated that it contained a
"substantial increment of risk" beyond a conventional investment portfolio. Id. at 88-89.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1988), the federal statute that insures pension plans, imposes a fiduciary duty on pension
fund managers to exercise a "prudent [person] standard of care," id. § 1104(a), and to dis-
charge their duties "solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries ...." Id.
§ 1 104(a)(1). Professors Langbein and Posner concluded that SRI would violate these fiduci-
ary duties because the minimal diversification characteristic of SRI entails higher risks without
the promise of higher returns. Langbein & Posner, supra note 2, at 104.
10. See infra notes 57, 63-70 and accompanying text (describing principles of modern
portfolio theory and importance of risk minimization through diversification).
11. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 2, at 77-79 (stating that stock market establishes
prices based on risk and return of securities in portfolio and projected future value); see also
infra note 49 (describing "efficiency" as ability of capital markets to process all available eco-
nomic information to point where prices fully reflect future value).
12. See infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text (reviewing recent findings that capital
markets do not operate efficiently).
13. See infra notes 141, 142, 144, and 152 (illustrating that some socially responsible
investment funds match or exceed traditional profit-centered market performance).
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nomic and legal case can be made for SRI. Part II focuses on the
legal environment in which socially responsible investment deci-
sions are made. Part III considers whether pension income security
is threatened by SRI and argues that the noneconomic benefits de-
rived from SRI cannot possibly be cost-free in an efficient market.
Nevertheless, so long as plan participants are informed about the
costs of SRI in an efficient capital market, there is no reason to pro-
hibit what is essentially a form of consumption. In addition, to the
extent that capital markets are inefficient, it may be possible to take
advantage of market "bubbles," or speculative "booms," and maxi-
mize income by engaging in ethical investing.
This Article focuses on SRI as practiced by pension funds.' 4 Cer-
tainly, universities, foundations, churches, private individuals, and
others make socially conscious investment decisions. Churches and
individual investors, however, are making private consumption
choices in exchange for a lower rate of return and are presumably
obtaining the satisfaction that comes from "knowing their money is
not part of the problem . ... i As for universities, many are
chartered as charitable corporations, and the legality of expending
university funds for social or political purposes will turn in each in-
14. For general information about the management of pension fund assets, see SIDNEY
COTrLE ET AL., PENSION ASSET MANAGEMENT: THE CORPORATE DECISION 9-27 (1980) (describ-
ing investment management of pension funds and related regulatory climate); PETER 0.
DIrz, PENSION FUNDS: MEASURING INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE 31-43 (1966) (reviewing in-
vestment strategies available to pension fund managers); WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS
P. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 135-52 (1976) (reviewing growth and characteris-
tics of pension fund investments); ERNESTJ.F. GRIFFES ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS:
MANAGEMENT, PLANNING, AND CONTROL 282-303 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining management of
pension fund investments); MARIO LEO, FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 117-31
(1975) (reviewing development and implementation of investment objectives of pension
funds); JOHN J. MCFADDEN, RETIREMENT PLANS FOR EMPLOYEES 199-209 (1988) (reviewing fi-
duciary duty of pension plan trustee to manage fund assets for benefit of participants and
beneficiaries); DAN M. McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 50-57 (3d ed. 1975)
(describing fiduciary duty of trustee in management of pension fund assets); ALICIA H. MUN-
NELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 93-129 (1982) (describing role of pension funds
as increasingly important financial intermediaries between savers and investors).
For discussions of the practice of social or ethical investment, see Louis A. KOHLMEIER,
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: STATE AND LOCAL PENSION FUND ASSET MANAGEMENT 17-26 (1976)
(maintaining that investment of public pension funds in state and local securities may result in
lower rates of return and underfunding of pension plans); MCFADDEN, supra, at 298-99 (sug-
gesting that socially responsible investment of pension fund would be inconsistent with ER-
ISA if fund participants were injured through lower rates of return); MUNNELL, supra, at 110-
14 (reviewing debate about social investing, particularly regarding issue whether ERISA per-
mits socially responsible investing if such investment entails higher risk); JEREMY RIFRIN &
RANDY BARBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE AGAIN: PENSIONS, POLITICS AND POWER IN THE 1980s
215-26 (1978) (proposing that state and union pension funds be used to encourage social
goals of promoting worker ownership and unionization and rebuilding declining industries).
15. See Gene Meyer, Ethics in Investing Takes Off KANSAS Crrv STAR, June 5, 1990, at Dl,
D 15 (quoting Leslie Gottlieb, spokesperson for Council on Economic Priorities in New York,
N.Y., as stating that "[w]e believe there are investors who feel more secure knowing their
money is not part of the problem than they would making more of it quickly").
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stance on the terms of the charter.1 6
SRI raises serious agency questions about participant information
and consent in the pension context that are generally absent in
other investment situations. Given the generally precarious finan-
cial status of many elderly citizens 17 and the well-known limitations
of Social Security,18 permitting SRI where the market is efficient and
where retirement income is at stake is a serious matter. In contrast,
to the extent that the capital market does not function efficiently,
there is less reason to be concerned about losses in retiree income.
I. WHAT IS SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING?
I have called [the notion of corporate social responsibility] a "fun-
damentally subversive doctrine" in a free society, and have said
that in such a society, "there is one and only one social responsi-
bility of business-to use its resources and engage in activities
designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules
of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition
without deception or fraud." 19
A. Portfolio Screening and Shareholder Activism
As the phrase "socially responsible" suggests, investment activity
meeting this description is dogged by a troubling threshold ques-
tion: what is the social good and how is it defined? 20 SRI invariably
involves subjective determinations about ethics and morality.2 1
Therefore, it is hard to generalize about the ambitions and methods
16. Langbein, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that various causes championed by proponents
of SRI are not within scope of some university charters). For a review of the law of charitable
corporations, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) §§ 379, 389
(1990) (describing duties of charitable trusts as set forth in prudent investor rule).
17. See David L. Wilson, Income and Poverty in the United States, NAT'LJ.,Jan. 12, 1991, at
100 (stating that elderly accounted for 11.4% of those below poverty line and about 20% of
11.1 million people near poverty line in 1989).
18. See, e.g., Leonard Sloane, Going Beyond Social Security, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1991, at A28
(quoting Alan W. Herman, senior vice president of Retirement Systems Group, as stating that
Social Security typically replaces only about 30% of pre-retirement income).
19. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-A Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 126 (quoting from MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962)).
20. The numerous names by which SRI is known give some indication of the host of
issues embraced by those who consider moral and ethical issues in trying to evaluate invest-
ment alternatives. Some socially responsible investors refer to themselves as green investors,
responsive investors, or environmentally friendly investors. See generally SIMPSON, supra note
1, at 3 (discussing difficulty in defining socially responsible investing).
21. See BRUYN, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that social investments introduce ethical and
moral criteria into investment decisions); id at 25 (observing that wide variety of ethical crite-
ria are relied on by socially responsible investors); MILLER, supra note 3, at 26-29 (summariz-
ing issues socially responsible investors consider, such as national defense, environmentalism,
animal rights, and racism).
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of socially responsible investors. Nonetheless, because there are a
wide variety of organizations that purport to practice SRI, it is possi-
ble to distinguish two distinct approaches.
The first and simplest method of SRI is portfolio screening. The
investor who practices portfolio screening refuses to invest in an en-
terprise that engages in activities that are antithetical to his or her
moral beliefs. 22 Portfolio screening was most prominently practiced
at the height of the South Africa divestment movement, when many
potential investments were shunned because of their ties to that
country. 23 Portfolio screening, also referred to as investor boy-
cott,24 requires that the would-be investor identify those social, ethi-
cal, or political issues that concern him or her and then research the
activities of potential investments to determine which investments
are incompatible with his or her views.
25
At the institutional investor level, objectionable corporate prac-
tices are detected by the use of detailed questionnaires, or
22. See, e.g., AMY L. DOMINI & PETER D. KINDER, ETHICAL INVESTING 2 (1984) (defining
"avoidance approach" to portfolio screening as refusal to invest in companies whose business
activities are offensive to investor); JUDD, supra note 5, at 9 (noting that "[p]robably the sim-
plest and most intuitive of the [socially responsible investment] approaches is avoiding 'un-
ethical' companies"); MILLER, supra note 3, at 29 (stating that avoidance approach entails
determining "socially irresponsible" activities and refusing to invest in companies engaged in
those activities); SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 5 (describing portfolio screening of ethical invest-
ment as including avoidance of companies engaged in activities morally opposed by investor).
23. See, e.g., DOMINI & KINDER, supra note 22, at 3 ("Perhaps the best known example of
avoidance is the current movement, especially among universities and pension funds, toward
divestiture of stocks or bonds of companies with operations in South Africa."); MILLER, supra
note 3, at 28 (stating that "more investors probably still screen out the stocks of companies
doing business in South Africa than any other class of securities"); SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 5
(noting that involvement in South Africa is commonly used in portfolio screening).
24. See SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 5 (describing practice of portfolio screening as avoiding
or boycotting investments in certain disfavored companies).
25. See MILLER, supra note 3, at 25, 29 (stating that first step in socially responsible invest-
ing is determining which social and ethical goals are important to investor).
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"screens," 26 that examine a wide range of issues. 27 The most com-
mon screening questions seek to determine whether a company ad-
heres to codes of behavior such as the Sullivan Principles, 28 the
26. The following is an example of an institutional screening questionnaire:
Employee relations
This assessment looks for such specifics as inclusiveness and equality in employment,
concern for the health and creative development of workers, and employees sharing in
ownership, decision making and profits.
Questions
1. Is the workforce (including management and board) representative of the
surrounding population? Does the company have programmes inclusive of those
with special needs such as the handicapped?
2. How does the company's cash compensation compare with the industry average?
Does the company provide equal pay for equal work? What is the employee
turnover rate? Does the company open its employment records for public
inspection?
3. Is the company's workforce unionised? Have there been labor disputes resulting
in strikes? Has the company been actively anti-union?
4. How does the company communicate to its workforce? Does the company involve
its employees in decision making? Does the company solicit ideas and sugges-
tions from its people? Are workers stakeholders in the financial success of the
company (stock ownership plans, profit sharing)?
5. Does the company go beyond traditional benefits to offer programmes such as
day care, tuition reimbursement, subsidised meals or recreation facilities,
maternity/paternity leave, sabbaticals, etc.?
6. What is the company's policy on reductions in the workforce? Are job retraining
and employment counselling offered when a worksite is closed?
Ratings
1. Company is a unique leader in its employment practices as made evident by
innovative employee participation, competitive compensation (including employee
stock ownership and profit sharing programmes), a representation of women and
minorities in its professional ranks equal to that in surrounding communities.
2. Company has strong commitment to workers, maintains healthy work areas and
generally positive management/worker communication.
3. Company has average employee relations with no reports of strikes, employment
discrimination or employee safety violations.
4. Company's employee relations are below acceptable standards in one major area
(labor disputes, employee safety, discrimination).
5. Company has serious ongoing employee relation problems as made evident by
strikes, current national labor boycotts, safety violations, or fair labor judgments
against the company.
Source: ANNE SIMPSON, THE GREENING OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT: How THE ENVIRON-
MENT, ETHICS, AND POLITICS ARE RESHAPING STRATEGIES 19 (1991).
27. See ALPERSON Er AL., supra note 1, at 17-18 (noting that socially responsible funds use
diverse combinations of screens to determine whether business practices of company are con-
sistent with social and ethical goals of fund). The individual investor can fashion his or her
own screens based on personal, ethical, and moral criteria. See MILLER, supra note 3, at 305-10
(describing how individuals can personally tailor their own socially responsible investment
portfolio).
28. See INDUSTRY SUPPORT UNIT INC., FOURTEENTH REPORT ON THE SIGNATORY COMPANIES
TO THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR SOUTH AFRICA 1 (Nov. 9, 1990) (explaining that Sullivan
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MacBride Principles, 29 or the relatively new Valdez Principles." ° In
addition, the lesser known Slepak Principles31 and the AIDS Princi-
ples3 2 will be likely new code of behavior screening devices for the
1990s. Other screens are designed to determine companies'
records on the issues of equal employment for minorities and wo-
men, environmental protection, animal rights, workplace fairness,
or product safety.33 In general, the portfolio screening approach to
Principles, also known as Statement of Principles for South Africa, were developed by Rever-
end Leon H. Sullivan in 1977 for companies that were doing business in that country). Ad-
herence to the Sullivan Principles requires that an annual independent evaluation of the
signatories' behavior be performed and be made available to the public. Id. Essentially, sig-
natories agree to try to positively affect the quality of life of South Africa's various racial
groups and to promote democratic government in that country. Id. at 6-29.
29. See Suzanne G. Harvey & TimothyJ. Conner, South Africa Turmoil Spawns Sodal Invest-
ment Growth Industry, STRATEGY WKLY. (Prudential-Bache Sec.), Feb. 28, 1990, at 30 (describing
investment principles formed as reaction to South African situation and noting related Mac-
Bride Principles that theoretically serve as "set of equal opportunity guidelines for U.S. com-
panies that are doing business in Northern Ireland. The guidelines stress corporate hiring
and promotional practices relative to the Catholic minority [in Northern Ireland]."). The
following legislation was introduced in Congress to provide for adherence to the MacBride
Principles by U.S. companies and organizations: S. 449, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., §§ 4-5 (1991);
H.R. 87, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 1 (1991); H.R. 856, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4-5 (1991).
30. See COALITION FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE ECONOMICS (CERES), 1990 CE-
RES GUIDE TO THE VALDEZ PRINCIPLES 7-10 (setting forth broad standards followed by corpo-
rations that become signatories to Valdez Principles, which represent code of conduct by
which investors can determine whether corporation is environmentally responsible). The
code, named after the well-known Alaskan environmental disaster in which an Exxon oil
tanker ran aground near Valdez, Alaska and spilled millions of gallons of crude oil into Prince
William Sound, is designed to "help socially concerned investors ... choose companies for
investments and help companies mobilize internal environmental programs." Barnaby J.
Feder, Group Sets Corporate Code on Environmental Conduct, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1989, at D1, D5
(reporting statements made by Social Investment Forum members); see also Laura L. Castro, A
Matter of Principle: Companies and Environmental Awareness, NEWSDAY, Sept. 8, 1989, at 13
(describing Valdez Principles and noting that they "'can be used by pension funds, college
endowments, religious portfolios and individuals to judge investments.... They can [also] be
used by consumers to determine whether they wish to patronize a company's goods and serv-
ices ... [and] by students to screen companies with which they are willing to consider employ-
ment.' ") (quoting Denis Hayes, co-chair of CERES).
31. The Slepak Principles comprise a behavioral code that is intended to lay down volun-
tary human rights guidelines for U.S. businesses operating in the Soviet Union and the Bal-
tics; legislation implementing the principles was introduced in Congress by Sen. John Heinz
(R-Pa.), Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), and Rep. John Miller (R-Wash.). S. 1018, 101st
Cong., Ist Sess. (1989); H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Senator Heinz stated in a
hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs that "the bill would increase
'business sensitivity' to the importance of human rights considerations in Soviet joint ven-
tures." Administration Opposes Rights Bill for U.S. Firms Operating in U.S.S.R., 6 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1194 (Sept. 20, 1989). Senator Heinz offered S. 1018 as an amendment to another bill
on the Senate floor, but withdrew his amendment without calling for a vote. 135 CONG. REC.
S8335-40 (daily ed. July 20, 1989). The bill was not reintroduced in the 102d Congress.
32. See Harvey & Conner, supra note 29, at 31 (describing acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS) Principles as "workplace bill of rights requiring corporate endorsers to
clearly articulate nondiscriminatory policies regarding people with AIDS or HIV [human im-
munodeficiency virus] infection"). The AIDS Principles were drafted by the Citizens Com-
mission on AIDS for New York City and Northern New Jersey in February 1988. Id.
33. See DOMINI & KINDER, supra note 22, at 6 (providing examples of investment screens
examining corporate interests in tobacco, alcohol, gambling, asbestos, Agent Orange, muni-
tions, nuclear energy, environmental performance, product safety, worker safety, or trade
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SRI is intended "less to draw attention to something than to refuse
to profit by it.'"34 It is a method of investment marked by an empha-
sis on separation and avoidance of ethically questionable corporate
behaviors.3 5 Not all portfolio screening, however, takes the form of
separation or avoidance, which are negative screening mechanisms.
Positive choice screens have also been developed to identify attrac-
tive investments in much the same way that negative screens are
used to eliminate undesirable ones.3 6 For example, some mutual
funds now actively market "companies thought to be socially be-
nign," such as companies that focus on becoming envirormentAlly
sound.37
with Communist countries or South Africa);JuDD, supra note 5, at 16-58 (reviewing additional
screens such as workplace advancement of women and minorities); MILLER, supra note 3, at
26-29 (surveying screens for shareholder rights, consumer rights, and product quality).
Some commentators believe that environmental issues will become the most popular screen
in the 1990s. SeeJUDD, supra note 5, at 16 ("If a single issue will propel socially responsible
investing into the headlines in the 1990s, it is the environment."); MILLER, supra note 3, at 28
(stating that "environmentalism leapt to the forefront as the [socially responsible investing]
crusade of the 1990s"). A large number of socially responsible funds have adopted environ-
mental screens. These funds include the Calvert-Ariel Appreciation Fund, Calvert Social In-
vestment Fund, Covenant Investment Management, Domini Social Index Trust, Dreyfus
Third Century, Green Century Balanced Fund, Muir California Tax Free Fund, New Alterna-
tives, Pax World Fund, Rightime Social Awareness Fund, and Schield Progressive Environ-
mental Fund. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 5, at 1-2 (identifying screens
used by socially responsible mutual funds based on investment compilations in fund
prospectuses).
34. DOMINI & KINDER, supra note 22, at 3.
35. DOMINI & KINDER, supra note 22, at 3 (asserting that portfolio screening approach to
SRI emphasizes refusal to profit from socially irresponsible investments); see also infra notes
38-43 and accompanying text (discussing how shareholder activism is based on investment in
"bad" companies in order to change corporate behavior).
36. See DOMINI & KINDER, supra note 22, at 5 ("The positive approach complements the
avoidance approach. Those adopting it seek investments in companies that enhance the qual-
ity of life .... ); see alsOJUDD, supra note 5, at 9 ("If you plan to invest at all, buying the good
must go hand-in-hand with avoiding the bad."); MILLER, supra note 3, at 31 (describing alter-
native investing as investment in companies deemed to be promoting valued social goals).
The range of positive criteria that may be used by socially responsible investment funds is as
broad as the range of negative criteria. See ALPERSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 23-62 (identifying
positive criteria as including corporate investment in education and efforts to combat AIDS);
DOMINI & KINDER, supra note 22, at 7 (listing positive investment screens such as involvement
in solar energy, alternative energy, recycling, health care, promotion of women and minori-
ties, energy conservation, good record on worker and product safety, favorable environmental
record, and efforts to meet needs of elderly or disabled persons); SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 54
(identifying positive screens including record of charitable donations, support for affordable
housing, and good record of community and employee relations).
37. See, e.g., Jane Bryant Quinn, 'Affinity' Plans Can Help Favorite Causer; Socially Conscious
Investing Gets Rolling, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, June 12, 1990, at 7C (identifying companies
that actively develop alternative energy sources or new methods of pollution control). The
Calvert-Ariel Appreciation Fund is an example of a fund that positively screens companies
that are environmentally sound and have secure market segments and strong environmental
reputations with customers, competitors, and employees. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE MUTUAL
FUNDS, supra note 5, at 1. The following investment plans also use positive choice screens:
Calvert Social Investment Funds (environmental protection, employee relations, women and
minority advancement, and product safety screens); Covenant Investment Management (com-
munity behavior, product quality and safety record, environmental record, and employee rela-
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The second form of SRI is the activist shareholder approach,
made famous by Ralph Nader in his campaigns to improve General
Motors' safety record.38 This technique is distinguished by the in-
vestor's desire to change company behavior by exercising rights that
flow from ownership of the enterprise.a9 The activist shareholder
invests in a particular firm because the firm engages in objectionable
behavior, and the shareholder hopes to change that behavior by
convincing the firm that it has ethical obligations to the wider com-
munity in which it operates.40 Unlike the boycott technique out-
lined above, the activist believes that the best way to effectuate
change is to maintain a relationship, albeit a combative one, with the
offending organization. 4' The use of this method has increased in
tions and equal opportunity record screens); Domini Social Index Trust (product quality,
environment, corporate citizenship, employee relations, women and minority advancement
screens); Dreyfus Third Century (environmental protection, occupational health and safety,
and equal employment opportunity screens); Green Century Balanced Fund (environmental
record screen); Muir California Tax Free Fund (environment, education, and housing
screens); New Alternatives (alternative energy, environmental protection, and resource recov-
ery screens); Parnassus Fund (out-of-favor companies with quality products, employee rela-
tions, community participation, and progressive and enlightened management screens); Pax
World Fund (life-support products and services, equal opportunity, and pollution control
screens); Rightime Social Awareness Fund (employee relations, corporate citizenship, alterna-
tive energy, and environmental practices screens); and Schield Progressive Environmental
Fund (environmental protection, environmental soundness, and alternative energy screens).
Id. at 1-2 (identifying positive screens used by socially responsible mutual funds).
38. See DOMINI & KINDER, supra note 22, at 192 ("In the early 1970s Ralph Nader and
other social reformers, and churches such as the Church of Christ began using shareholder
resolutions as instruments of social change, and today remain its most consistent expo-
nents."); SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 7-8 (noting that Ralph Nader is credited with starting
shareholder activism with his campaign against General Motors); Donald E. Schwartz, The
Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 421,423 (1971) (not-
ing that Ralph Nader-inspired "Campaign to Make General Motors Responsible" is generally
recognized as giving rise to activist shareholder approach); see also Burton G. Malkiel & Rich-
ard E. Quandt, Moral Issues in Investment Policy, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 1 (describ-
ing efforts to establish corporate shareholders committee that would make recommendations
to corporation on improving vehicle safety and decreasing automobile pollution).
39. SIMPSoN, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that shareholder activism is based on investment
in ethically irresponsible companies in attempt to exercise ownership rights and thereby steer
company in more ethically laudable direction).
40. See, e.g., DOMINI & KINDER, supra note 22, at 8 ("Some ethical investors want to do
more than avoid bad companies and invest in good ones. They want to change the bad into
the good. For these investors there is the activist approach.");JuDD, supra note 5, at 10 (dis-
cussing ethical investment techniques and commenting that "[t]he third approach to socially
responsible investing, changing the bad into good, is most often employed by church groups,
socially conscious institutions, and activist organizations"); MILLER, supra note 3, at 33
(describing interventionist corporate investing as "investment in irresponsible rather than re-
sponsible companies, with the goal of inducing a change in corporate behavior through stock-
holder pressure" and direct action); SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 6 (stating that socially
responsible investing includes active targeting of investments with aim of promoting social
change, including investing in "bad" companies in bid to steer them in new direction).
41. See FRED D. BALDWIN, CONFLICTING INTERESTS: CORPORATE-GOVERNANCE CONTRO-
VERSIES 68 (1984) (reviewing initial efforts by shareholders to change corporate behavior).
For example, a student during the Vietnam War purchased shares of Honeywell stock simply
for the purpose of voicing his opinions of company affairs in shareholders' meetings. Pills-
bury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Minn. 1971). The student then demanded to
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frequency since initial efforts in the 1970s,42 even though con-
straints hinder the technique's effectiveness.
43
see the company's records concerning munitions production. Id. at 409. The company re-
fused and the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the refusal. Id. at 413 (alfirming rejection of
petition for writ of mandamus to compel production of corporate records). In 1970, the Pro-
ject for Corporate Responsibility similarly attempted to press its own philosophy of corporate
responsibility on General Motors through the use of shareholder resolutions. See DAVID VO-
GEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORArION: CrIZEN CHALLENGES TO BUSINESS Atrn Rm 71 (1978)
(describing goals of activists that established Campaign GM). The Project also proposed res-
olutions addressing specific issues such as air pollution. BALDWIN, supra, at 66 (noting that
seven of nine resolutions originally proposed by Project for Corporate Responsibility ad-
dressed air pollution). Two General Motors shareholder resolutions sponsored by the Project
were included in proxy statements that would have expanded the board of directors by the
addition of a woman, a minority individual, and an environmentalist, and also would have
established a Committee for Corporate Responsibility. VOGEL, supra, at 78. Although the
proposals obtained support from less than three percent of the shares voted and were ulti-
mately rejected, id. at 85, General Motors later expanded its board to include a minority indi-
vidual and established a Public Policy Committee similar in purpose to the Project's proposed
Committee for Corporate Responsibility. Id.
42. See LowRY, supra note 3, at 26-27 (describing rise in annual number of socially re-
sponsible shareholder resolutions from 30 in 1972 to between 100 and 200 during 1976-1988
and to high of 300 in 1990); see also Myron P. Curzan & Mark L. Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate
Democracy: Control of Investment Managers' Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 670, 677-78 (1980) (noting that proxy voting on social responsibility issues increased
sharply during 1970s).
43. See LowRY, supra note 3, at 27 (admitting that voting strength of socially responsible
investors is limited); Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 42, at 671-72 (concluding that ability of
small investors to affect corporate policies is quite limited, due to enormous holdings of insti-
tutional investors). One of the principal obstacles to the effectiveness of the activist share-
holder approach is the rules established by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
governing proxy statements and shareholder resolutions. Under SEC rules, a socially respon-
sible shareholder resolution may be excluded if it deals with a matter that is not "significantly
related to the registrant's (the corporation's] business," 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1991), is
"beyond the registrant's power to effectuate," id. § 240.14a-8(c)(6), "relat[es] to the conduct
of the ordinary business operations of the registrant," id. § 240.14a-8(c)(7), or deals with sub-
stantially the same matter as a prior proposal recently submitted for a vote and rejected by a
very wide margin, id. § 240.14a-8(c)(12). With respect to the first basis for excluding share-
holder resolutions, the SEC has clarified that ethical and social issues will pass muster if there
is a nexus between those issues and the business of the corporation. See Robert N. Leavell,
Corporate Social-Reform: The Business Judgment Rule and Other Considerations, 20 GA. L. REv. 565,
586 (1986) (reviewing development and interpretation of SEC Rule 14a-8).
An earlier version of Rule 14a-8 proved to be quite effective in barring socially responsible
shareholder resolutions such as "Campaign GM," see generally Schwartz, supra note 38, because
under the earlier rule, General Motors was able to block seven of nine reform resolutions
sought by the Project for Corporate Responsibility. See Leavell, supra, at 583 (noting that
proposed shareholder resolutions were excluded under SEC rules); supra note 41 (describing
proposed resolutions and noting their dispensation). There is speculation that when the SEC
modified Rule 14a-8 in 1983, see Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218, 38,223 (1983), it
strengthened the ability of companies to bar resolutions failing to meet higher vote thresholds
and may have been responsible for the sudden decline in number of resolutions between 1983
and 1984, when shareholder resolution volume declined from 111 to 48. ALPERSON ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 8. Yet, the number of shareholder resolutions voted on climbed to 216 in
1989, after partial reversal of the Rule 14a-8 changes was required by United Church Bd. for
World Ministries v. SEC. Id. The court in United Church struck a portion of the final rule amend-
ing Rule 14a-8 for failure to provide adequate notice under the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). United Church Bd. for World Ministries v. SEC. 617 F. Supp. 837,
839-40 (D.D.C. 1985) (concluding that SEC's notice of proposed rulemaking should include
agency views and information on which agency views were based). Still, the prospect of fur-
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Obviously, socially responsible investors can and indeed do
employ both methods simultaneously. 44 There is no reason that an
investment portfolio cannot be developed as a result of both avoid-
ance or positive choice screening and expected shareholder activ-
ism. This Article focuses primarily on the avoidance or positive
choice approach in the private or public pension context, because in
that context, the use of screens has become a principal method for
implementing social and ethical considerations into investment
decisions.
B. SRI Versus Traditional Investing: The Efficient Markets Hypothesis
Pension plans in the United States, both public and private, now
hold approximately $3732 billion in assets.45 These assets grow
continually and represent a substantial portion of the funds avail-
able for capital investments. 46 It is therefore not surprising that the
debate over the use of social or political criteria in administering
these funds is frequently polarized, particularly when the issue of
accepting a lower rate of return or increased risk arises. Indeed, the
most contentious issues have to do with the differences in the risk/
return ratio between traditional and social investments. The first
issue is basic: some proponents of SRI argue that social investing
has no extra cost because ethical investments do not require a loss
of return at a given level of risk.47 The second issue is more com-
plex: should social investing by pension funds be allowed even if it
does entail a lower rate of return? A discussion of the first question
ther changes to Rule 14a-8 designed to restrict shareholder activism remains. SeeJolie Solo-
mon, Activists Fear SEC Proxy Rule, BOSTON GLOBE, May 10, 1992, at 33 (noting that SEC
Chairman Richard Breeden and SEC Commissioner Rick Roberts have expressed "interest in
restricting social policy ballot initiatives"); Anne Schwimmer, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE,
Mar. 30, 1992, at 16 (revealing that corporations have asked SEC to tighten Rule 14a-8 to
limit shareholder proposals).
44. See SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 5-6 (reviewing portfolio screening and shareholder ac-
tivism as complementary methods of socially responsible investing).
45. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE Sys., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS,
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND LIABILrrES: FIRST QUARTER 1992 6 (1992) [hereinafter FEDERAL RE-
SERVE, FIRST QUARTER 1992].
46. See id (noting that total financial assets of pension plans in first quarter of 1992 were
$15,372.1 billion). Pension funds account for about 24% of total financial assets in the
United States. Id By contrast, pension funds accounted for only 3% of total financial assets
in 1950, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, TRENDS IN PENSIONS 420 (1992), and grew to 14% in
1980. FEDERAL RESERVE, FIRST QUARTER 1992, supra note 45, at 5 (noting that pension fund
growth has outpaced growth in total financial assets).
47. See, e.g., BRUYN, supra note 2, at 12 ("Social investment has outperformed traditional
investment designed to maximize profits alone."); LowRY, supra note 3, at 4 (arguing that
socially responsible investing "can pay off very handsomely relative to investments and busi-
ness done solely 'for profit' "); Interview with Joan Bavaria, president of Social Investment
Forum, in Eugene, Oregon (May 16, 1986) ("You can definitely have the same performance
[from socially responsible investing as from traditional investing], so why not integrate your
social values?").
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follows, whereas an answer to the second question is set forth in
Part III.
A review of the mechanics of traditional investing and of the well-
known capital asset pricing model (CAPM)48 leads inexorably to the
conclusion that SRI must involve a less attractive risk/return ratio
than traditional investing if capital markets are efficient.49 Yet, to
the extent that capital markets are not efficient, an "inefficiency hy-
pothesis" provides that it may be possible to pursue SRI and still
maximize income. 50 To test both the efficient markets hypothesis
and the inefficiency hypothesis, some preliminary data on the per-
formance of certain socially targeted investments is included. This
data suggests that where social investment funds have outperformed
the market, superior performance may be due to the fact that SRI
tracks the kinds of speculative "booms" that characterize inefficient
markets. 5 1 Alternatively, SRI screens may be serving as proxy de-
vices for the concepts that underlie traditional portfolio construc-
48. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (describing fundamentals of capital asset
pricing model).
49. In efficient markets, prices reflect a forecast of future value based on the market
participants' agreement on price information. See EUGENE F. FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, TilE
THEORY OF FINANCE 335 (1972) (stating that in efficient markets, prices reach equilibrium
because of agreement by market participants about implications of all available information
for current prices and probability of future prices); see also EUGENE F. FAMA, FOUNDAnONS OF
FINANCE 133 (1976) ("An efficient capital market is a market that is efficient in processing
information.... In an efficient market, prices 'fully reflect' available information."). If capital
markets are efficient, socially responsible investing will result in higher risk or lower returns
because investment decisions based on noneconomic factors will be penalized. See Langbein
& Posner, supra note 2, at 85-89 (concluding that socially responsible investment portfolio will
entail higher risk if capital markets are efficient).
50. Under the "inefficiency hypothesis," prices, which are based on noneconomic con-
siderations, do not perfectly reflect projections of future earnings based on all available infor-
mation. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 2, at 82 (asserting that investments based on
public information are not likely to outperform market). The inefficiency hypothesis takes
different forms, including the argument that many investors do not base their decisions on
information but respond instead to signals or "noise" in the investment system. See Fischer
Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 531-32 (1986) (arguing that many trades of stock are not based on
clear information, but rather on "noise" or unsubstantiated rumors regarding future stock
performance); David M. Cutler et al., What Moves Stock Prices?, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Spring
1989, at 9 (concluding that variation in stock prices is greater than what would be expected if
investment decisions were based solely on publicly available information); Werner F.M.
DeBondt & Richard H. Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, 40 J. FIN. 793, 793 (1985)
(stating that stock prices "overreact" to unexpected events and dramatic news); Robert A.
Haugen et al., The Effect of Volatility Changes on the Level of Stock Prices and Subsequent Expected
Returns, 46J. FIN. 985, 1006 (1991) (maintaining that volatility of stock prices is not related to
"real economic events," but rather to stock buyers' emotions or intuitions); Charles M.C. Lee
et al., Anomalies: Closed-End Mutual Funds, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVE, Fall 1990, at 163 (casting
doubt on efficient markets hypothesis by stating that trades based on irrational beliefs can
influence price); Robert J. Shiller, Speculative Prices and Popular Models, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVE,
Spring 1990, at 56-63 (demonstrating that many investment decisions are emotional or intui-
tive and not based on information, or are responsive to unexpected news and dramatic
events).
51. See infra notes 141, 142, 144, and 152 (explaining performance of socially responsi-
ble funds compared to market).
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tion theory.5 2
1. Some simple economics of portfolio creation
Those who argue that ethical investment is legal where the finan-
cial benefits are equal to those of a similar investment are not
making a logical argument. No two investments are the same.
One investment will always offer better returns, lower risk or
better diversification for the portfolio. If trustees are faced with
two potential investments which they judge to be equal on finan-
cial grounds but one offers social benefits, then they should split
their investments equally between the two to gain additional
diversification.
5 3
Pension fund managers who engage in traditional investing do so
with one objective in mind, which is the protection of pension secur-
ity through the achievement of the highest possible return on an
investment that represents some acceptable level of risk.54 Thus,
the traditional investor really cares about only two issues with re-
spect to a potential investment: risk and return. 55 In developing an
entire portfolio, however, the traditionalist tries to eliminate non-
systematic risk by diversifying and, at the same time, tries to en-
hance efficiency. 56 The four concepts of risk, return, diversification,
and efficiency constitute the basis of modern portfolio theory.
5 7
52. See LowitY, supra note 3, at 54 (insisting that socially responsible investments may
prove more profitable than some traditional investments because SRI eschews short-term
profits for long-term gains from investments in stable, growing companies).
53. SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 85-86 (quoting Nell Minow of Institutional Investor Serv-
ices, Inc.).
54. For general background on the economics of pension fund investing, see CoTrLE E
AL., supra note 14, at 119-76 (describing methods of investment analyses and portfolio con-
struction and management); McGiLL, supra note 14, at 434-69 (reviewing regulatory con-
straints and investment objectives of pension fund portfolio management); MUNNELL, supra
note 14, at 108 (stating that performance of pension fund investments is traditionally mea-
sured by rate of return on fund assets).
55. See, e.g., COTILE ETAL.,Supra note 14, at 38-47 (stating that determination of accepta-
ble risk and return objectives are "key considerations in making investment decisions"); JOHN
J. PRINGLE & ROBERT S. HARRIS, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE 144-51 (1987) (main-
taining that investment decisions are characterized by balance between risk and rate of re-
turn); MARTIN J. SCHWIMMER & EDWARD MALCA, PENSION AND INSTITUTIONAL PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT 93-102 (1976) (noting that "risk is the uncertainty in any investment" and
describing risk management approaches available to pension fund managers).
56. See PRINGLE & HARRIS, supra note 55, at 142 (stating that fundamental aspect of finan-
cial management is that risk can be reduced through diversification). But see Harry M. Marko-
witz, Portfolio Selection, 7J. FIN. 77, 79 (1952) ("Diversification cannot eliminate all variance...
in expected returns.").
57. For the seminal work on modern portfolio theory, see Markowitz, supra note 56, at 89
(stating general rule that diversification of investment portfolio across industries will lower
risk and increase yield). For a general discussion of subsequent work in economics concern-
ing modern portfolio theory, see John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of
Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. STAT. 13, 19-20 (1965)
(finding that diversification is necessary for portfolio optimization); William F. Sharpe, Capital
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Similarly, the elements of risk and return form the foundation of
the capital asset pricing model.58 The CAPM may be stated as fol-
lows: r-rf = beta (r,-rf), where r is the expected return on any stock;
beta is the covariance of the stock in the market portfolio; ry is the
risk-free interest rate; r,, is the expected return on the market; r-rf is
the expected risk premium; and r,,-rf is the expected market risk pre-
mium. 59 Return is essentially an investment's expected profitability,
which turns on the likelihood of any given performance scenario.
For example, if there is a 50% chance that a particular investment
will return 10% this year and also a 50% chance that it will return
only 5%, then the expected return is: .5(10%) + .5(5%) = 7.5%.60
Risk is a measure of the uncertainty or standard deviation of the
return.61 This means that the value of any potential investment will
depend on the future return the investor expects to receive, as well
as on the likelihood that the return will be realized. 62
If investors are rational, a given investment must provide a higher
rate of return to compensate for increased risk. Thus, risk and re-
turn are positively correlated: more risk, more return; less risk, less
return.63 This relationship enables a manager to determine whether
Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19J. FIN. 425,436-40 (1964)
(maintaining that diversification of investments reduces systemic risk).
58. For a basic discussion of the relationship between risk and return based on the impli-
cations of the CAPM, see RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE FINANCE 136-39 (3d ed. 1988) (describing linear relationship between risk and return
under CAPM); WILLIAM F. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 20.24 (1970)
(maintaining that portfolio theory relies on calculation of probability of various rates of re-
turn); EzRA SOLOMON &JOHNJ. PRINGLE, AN INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 301-
08, 427-35 (1977) (explaining market risk premium basis of CAPM).
59. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 58, at 134-43 (describing sensitivity calculation for
expected market risk premiums under CAPM and stating that "[the risk of a well-diversified
portfolio depends on the average beta of the securities included in the portfolio"); JEROME B.
COHEN ET AL., INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 150-57 (1982) (describing
development of portfolio with highest risk through calculation of standard deviation of re-
turn); David W. Mullins, Jr., Does the Capital Asset Pricing Model Work?, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-
Feb. 1982, at 108 (describing pricing model and discussing formula for calculating expected
returns).
60. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and
Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 777-78 (1985) (calculating expected portfolio return
by using sum of expected returns of portfolio assets).
61. See supra note 58 (listing sources that discuss risk and return under CAPM).
62. See PRINGLE & HARRIS, supra note 55, at 135-41 (stating that present value of poten-
tial investment is based on calculation of both probable returns and variability of outcomes or
risk).
63. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 59, at 199 ("One of the primary assumptions of the
capital asset pricing model is that there is a positive long-run relationship between risk and
return and that the relationship tends to be linear.").
The CAPM theory has been much criticized. See, e.g., id. at 205 (noting that serious ques-
tions have been raised about whether CAPM accurately describes true relationship between
risk and return in marketplace); THOMAS R. DYCKMAN & DALE MORSE, EFFICIENT CAPITAL MAR-
KETS AND ACCOUNTING 2 (1986) ("The CAPM is a simplistic approach to pricing securities and
is not likely to be completely accurate."); BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGE-
MENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE 83 (1986) ("Neither the capital asset pricing model
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a particular portfolio will be efficient. A portfolio of investments is
efficient under either of two conditions: for a given level of return,
the portfolio has the lowest possible level of risk; or, for a given
level of risk, it has the highest expected return.6
Finally, the risk facing an investor will either be systematic or non-
systematic. 65 Systematic risk is risk that cannot be eliminated
through increased diversification of the portfolio.66 It is the basic
risk associated with changes in the economy over which the investor
and other marketplace actors have no control.67 Nonsystematic risk,
however, is risk that can be completely eliminated through appro-
priate diversification of the portfolio.6s An efficient portfolio will
contain only systematic risk, whereas nonsystematic risk will be en-
tirely eliminated through diversification of the investment portfo-
(CAPM) nor any of the other asset pricing models commands universal acceptance as an ex-
planation of the expected return of assets."). Some critics, however, recognize it as more
accurate than alternative pricing models. See Mullins, supra note 59, at 112-13 (recognizing
imperfections in CAPM but concluding that alternative models have not proved to be
superior).
64. See Markowitz, supra note 56, at 79 ("The portfolio with maximum expected return is
not necessarily the one with minimum variance. There is a rate at which the investor can gain
expected return by taking on variance or reduce variance by giving expected returns."); see
also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL El AL., THE ECONOMICS OF MUTUAL FUND MARKETS: COMPETrrION
VERSUS REGULATION 29 (1990) ("Given the choice between two investments with the same
expected return, the investor will always select the security with the lower risk."); SHARPE,
supra note 58, at 26 ("If two portfolios have the same [risk] and different expected returns, the
one with the largest return is preferred. If two portfolios have the same expected return and
different [risks], the one with the smaller [risk] is preferred.").
65. See PRINGLE & HARRIS, supra note 55, at 152 (stating that "the risk of any individual
stock can be separated into two components: nondiversifiable risk and diversiiable risk [or system-
atic risk and nonsystematic risk, respectively]"); Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 60, at 777
(describing nonsystematic risks as "risks peculiar to the issuer" and systematic risks as "risks
to issuers generally").
66. See PRINGLE & HARRIS, supra note 55, at 152 ("Nondiversifiable [or systematic] risk is
that part of the total risk that is related to the general economy or the stock market as a whole
and, hence, cannot be eliminated by diversification. Nondiversifiable risk is also known as mar-
ket risk, or systematic risk."); Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 60, at 177 (referring to system-
atic risk as "nondiversifiable risk"); Langbein & Posner, supra note 2, at 80 (noting that
systematic risk cannot be reduced through diversification but can by other means).
67. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 58, at 132 (stating that systematic risk, or "market
risk," cannot be eliminated through diversification); CorrLE Er AL., supra note 14, at 160
("[Systematic] risk stems from underlying characteristics of the environment in which security
markets operate."); LONGSTRETH, supra note 63, at 82 ("By holding a well-diversified portfo-
lio, one can remove issue-specific risks, leaving only the systemic risk of the particular market
for which the securities in the portfolio are a proxy.").
68. See BAUMOL, supra note 64, at 29 ("Residual risk is the risk unique to the specific asset
(stock); it is also called unsystematic or diversifiable risk .... However, when an investor
builds a portfolio of stocks, he [or she] can reduce the unsystematic risk almost to zero.");
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 58, at 132 (maintaining that unsystematic risk can potentially be
eliminated through diversification); PRINGLE & HARRIS, supra note 55, at 152 ("Diversifiable
risk is that part of total risk that is unique to the company or industry and that, therefore, can
be eliminated by diversification. Diversifiable risk is sometimes also referred to as unsystematic
risk.").
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lio.69 The market will not reward a portfolio that has not eliminated
all nonsystematic risk with a high rate of return.
70
The CAPM and the assumption that markets are efficient are ex-
tremely important to the theoretical debate about the costs and de-
sirability of socially responsible investing.7' At the outset, one
should note that the CAPM assumes, inter alia, that financial markets
are frictionless and that there are no transaction costs. 7 2 While
these assumptions are clearly unrealistic, they do not wholly invali-
69. See SHARPE, supra note 58, at 97 ("Efficient portfolios have no unsystematic risk....
A portfolio (or security) with unsystematic risk is inefficient.").
70. See Ferris & Rykaczewski, supra note 3, at 62 (stating that financial markets will not
reward portfolio that bears unnecessary nonsystematic risk that can be eliminated through
broader selection of investments); Langbein & Posner, supra note 2, at 79 (maintaining that
diversifiable risk "is not compensated risk" because "it does not command a higher return
than a less risky stock yielding ... the same expected return"). In contrast, an expert on
modern portfolio theory allowed that it was possible for a nondiversified portfolio to obtain
high returns. Markowitz, supra note 56, at 89 ("It is conceivable that one security might have
an extremely higher yield and lower variance than all other securities; so much so that one
particular undiversified portfolio would give maximum (yield] and minimum [risk]."). The
following figure exhibits the relationship between diversification and the elimination of non-
systematic risk.
FIGURE I






1 5 10 15 20 Number of
Securities
Diversification can eliminate nonsystematic risk, but it cannot eliminate systematic (market)
risk.
Adapted from: RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 134 (3d ed. 1988).
71. See LOWRY, supra note 3, at 39-41 (recognizing that performance ofsocially responsi-
ble investments is directly related to validity of efficient market theory).
72. Fora discussion of some of the variables of the CAPM, see MICHAEL C.JENSEN, SrUD-
IES IN THE THEORY OF CAPITAL MARKETS 5 (1972) (identifying assumptions underpinning
CAPM, including frictionless markets where transaction costs are negligible); PRINGLE & HAR-
RIS, supra note 55, at 155-56 (listing critical assumptions essential to CAPM theory, including
notions that investors are risk-averse and make decisions based on single time period).
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date the basic implication of the modem portfolio theory for ethical
investing, which is that the inclusion of criteria other than risk,
return, diversification, and efficiency reduces the number of poten-
tially attractive investments and thereby diminishes a fund man-
ager's ability to assemble an efficient portfolio.
73
An important corollary of CAPM, which has been referred to as
the "separation theorem," implies that in an efficient market, inves-
tors will maximize their incomes by separating investment and con-
sumption decisions. 74 Under this theorem, investors who wish to
"do good" should first maximize investment income by positioning
themselves on the "efficiency frontier" 75 and then by spending their
73. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 2, at 85 (arguing that portfolio constructed in
accordance with social principles will be less diversified than one constructed with optimal
strategy of high return portfolio design).
74. SeeJACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONs 436 (1988) (arguing that in-
come maximization in efficient markets results from separation of productive and consump-
tive decisions); Ferris & Rykaczewski, supra note 3, at 61 ("[The separation] principle
contends that optimal portfolio management requires a separation between the investor's
preferences or tastes and the criteria used by the fund for its investment decision.").
75. See COHEN Er AL., supra note 59, at 150-57 (identifying "efficient frontier"); CoTrLE
ET AL., supra note 14, at 170 (maintaining that "efficient frontier" is bounded by calculation of
maximum return at each level of risk). As used throughout this Article, "behind the efficiency
frontier" refers to the traditional investor's view of where ethical investing and other "beat
the market" strategies will place a social investor. A traditionalist would expect to find SRI
portfolios behind the efficiency frontier because the efficient markets hypothesis relies on fun-
damental economic information to predict stock performance and SRI does not. See Langbein
& Posner, supra note 2, at 88-89 (suggesting that SRI can result in "serious underdiversifica-
tion" and place investor behind efficiency frontier at given level of risk). Of course, if the
market is inefficient and SRI enables an investor to maximize income, then clearly SRI portfo-
lios are not really behind an efficiency frontier. For the sake of simplicity, however, SRI port-
folios are referred to in this Article as being behind the efficiency frontier or simply "behind
the frontier" even when they represent an income maximizing strategy. Figure 2 provides a
visual representation of the efficiency frontier concept.
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investment income in a charitable way.7 6 If investment income is
maximized, investors will have more to spend on charity than would
be possible if they positioned themselves inside the efficiency fron-
tier by mixing investment and consumption decisions.7 7 If capital
markets are efficient, then socially responsible investors are neces-
sarily somewhere behind the efficiency frontier, and the CAPM sug-




CAPM suggests that an investor will maximize income by holding a diversified portfolio,
which will lie along the efficiency frontier. The efficient markets hypothesis also says that
because every stock price reflects the stock's real value, it is not possible to pick and choose







Each cross shows the expected return and standard deviation from investing in a single stock.
The broken-egg-shaped area shows the possible combinations of expected return and
standard deviation if you invest in a mixture of stocks. If you like high expected returns and
dislike high standard deviations, you will prefer portfolios along the heavy line. These are
efficient portfolios. Whether you want to choose the minimum risk portfolio (portfolio A) or
the maximum expected return portfolio (portfolio B) or some other efficient portfolio
depends on how much you dislike taking risk.
Source: RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPOiRATE FINANCE
155 (3d ed. 1988).
76. Note that the CAPM indicates that an investor who wishes to maximize income
should hold some combination of a market portfolio and riskless assets such as treasury bills.
See LOWRY, supra note 3, at 19 (stating that traditional investors do not "mix money and moral-
ity," but pursue profit maximization and address social concerns indirectly through charitable
contributions). This combination will not be a point on the efficiency frontier, but will lie
beyond or in front of the frontier.
77. Consumption here refers to an investor's decision to "buy" the satisfaction that
comes from giving to a charitable cause, whether political, environmental, or otherwise. See
Ferris & Rykaczewski, supra note 3, at 61 ("By maximizing [income] ... each individual has a
greater financial ability to satisfy personal preference or desires.").
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One reason that the CAPM suggests SRI will be unattractive is
that the socially responsible investor's portfolio is likely to contain a
degree of nonsystematic risk that is created by certain ethically, so-
cially, or politically dictated investment decisions. 78 Because the use
of negative screens bars investment in certain companies, diversifi-
cation of the socially responsible portfolio will be constrained, and it
may be impossible to eliminate systematic risks. 79 The heightened
risks that are expected in a pension fund portfolio developed consis-
tent with social criteria would not be compensated by the prospect
of increased returns and would be borne instead by the socially re-
sponsible investor.80
A pension plan may be organized as either a defined contribution
or a defined benefit plan.81 The risk of uncertain returns to pension
funds under different investment strategies varies under these two
types of plans. A defined contribution plan is comparable to a sav-
ings account because it establishes an individual account for each
employee that will be drawn upon that employee's retirement.8 2
The plan specifies the rate of contribution into the plan rather than
the benefit after retirement, however. For this reason, retirement
benefits from defined contribution plans vary according to invest-
ment gains.8 3
78. See Gordon & Komhauser, supra note 60, at 778 (noting that investors generally do
not receive greater expected return for nonsystematic risk element).
79. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 2, at 85 (concluding that portfolio constructed in
accord with socially responsible criteria will be less diversified and will therefore entail more
risk than portfolio constructed on principle of profit maximization).
80. See Ferris & Rykaczewski, supra note 3, at 62 (noting that great risks are borne by
pension plan participants and not by plan trustees or managers when plan indulges in SRI).
81. A defined contribution plan is "a pension plan which provides for an individual ac-
count for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the
participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of ac-
counts of other participants which may be allocated to such participant's account." Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1988).
A defined benefit plan is:
a pension plan other than an individual account plan; except that a pension plan
which is not an individual account plan and which provides a benefit derived from
employer contributions which is based partly on the balance of the separate account
of a participant-
(A) for the purposes of section 1052 of this title [setting minimum participation stan-
dards], shall be treated as an individual account plan, and
(B) for the purposes of paragraph (23) of this section [1002] and section 1054 of this
title [29] [governing benefit accrual requirements], shall be treated as an individual
account plan to the extent benefits are based upon the separate account of a partici-
pant and as a defined benefit plan with respect to the remaining portion of benefits
under the plan.
Id. § 1002(35).
82. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 5 (detailing operation of defined contribution pension
plans).
83. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 5 (describing differences between defined contribution
and defined benefit pension plans).
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In contrast, a defined benefit plan is one in which the plan spon-
sor promises to pay specified retirement benefits. The plan spon-
sor, generally an employer, bears the risk if the find does not
perform as expected, because the employer must meet its obliga-
tions to the beneficiaries regardless of the actual return on the
fund's investments.8 4 In the defined contribution context, however,
the employee bears the risk that a fund will not perform as ex-
pected.8 5 At first glance, it might appear that plan participants
should be wholly indifferent to the practice of social investing by
fund managers in the defined benefit context because it is the plan
sponsor who suffers in the event that the investments under-
perform. This is not the case, however, because underperforming
funds are less able to provide cost-of-living adjustments, and fund
managers may adopt conservative investment strategies that provide
lower benefits to future participants.8 6
In addition, the fact that private pensions are insured via the Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)8 7 does not mean that
participants in defined benefit or defined contribution plans should
be indifferent to the performance of their funds.88 The risk borne
by defined contribution participants is fairly obvious and is not ma-
terially affected by the presence of federal insurance. Similarly, the
PBGC's role with respect to defined benefit plans is neither cost-free
nor entirely comforting, for two reasons. First, the PBGC assesses
premiums based on the riskiness of the plan to be insured: the risk-
ier the plan, the more money PBGC charges to insure it.89 Thus,
84. See GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 14, at 178 (noting that under defined benefit plan,
pension fund commits to make payments based on specified formula, irrespective of pension
fund growth).
85. See GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 14, at 178 ("Under defined contribution plans,
the benefit itself is not precisely stated in advance, but is whatever pension can be purchased
at retirement by the funds that have been accumulated on behalf of each plan participant.").
86. See Ferris & Rykaczewski, supra note 3, at 61 (concluding that "both present and fu-
ture pension recipients may be adversely affected by lower fund return in spite of a defined
benefits package").
87. ERISA established the PBGC, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1988), granted it juridical
capacity, id. § 1303(b), and bestowed upon it extensive investigatory and enforcement pow-
ers. Id. § 1303(a).
88. But see GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 14, at 194. William Greenough and Francis
King argue that:
The combined effect of the PBGC and the funding standard regulations established
by other sections of the Pension Reform Act of 1974 can be expected to do much to
improve the capacity of defined benefit pension plans to meet their benefit obliga-
tions and to assure participants that their pension plan can keep its promises, even in
the event the employer goes out of business.
Id.
89. The premiums charged by the PBGC to an employer for each participant in the em-
ployer's pension plan depends on whether the plan is underfunded. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1306(a)(3)(A)-(E) (1988). Where the plan is sufficiently funded, the PBGC will charge
the employer $19.00 annually for each participant in a single employer plan. Id.
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the presence of nonsystematic risk will be reflected in added costs
borne by the plan for insurance to the extent that risk precipitates
an underfunding of plans.
Second, there has recently been much speculation about the sol-
vency of the PBGC and many believe that its reserves are vastly out-
weighed by its liabilities. 90 Thus, even participants in defined
benefit plans ought to hope that plan managers eliminate as much
risk as possible in assembling a portfolio, because there is reason to
wonder whether the PBGC could satisfy all claims in the event of a
major plan sponsor failure or reorganization.9 1
In sum, the economic theory of efficient markets and the CAPM
strongly suggest that inclusion in the investment calculus of ethical
and social factors will limit the pool of investment choices and
thereby increase the presence of nonsystematic risk in investment
portfolios. This circumstance will manifest itself in reduced invest-
ment returns and a loss of income, at a given level of risk, for par-
ticipants in pension plans, particularly in the defined contribution
context.
2. The inefficiency hypothesis
Despite this discouraging result, the evidence in support of the
efficient markets hypothesis is not completely monolithic. Over the
past decade, an increasing number of studies have suggested that
because capital markets may be subject to inefficient speculative
booms, 92 it may actually be possible for non-CAPM strategies such
§ 1306(a)(3)(A)(i). Where the plan is underfunded, however, the employer will be charged a
variable rate of up to $53.00 annually per participant. Id. § 1306(a)(3)(E)(iv)(I).
ERISA covers only defined benefit plans, and not defined contribution plans. Id.
§§ 1321(a)-(b)(1). All defined benefit plans are mandatorily covered whether the employer
pays the required premiums or not. Idl § 132 1(a). Where a covered plan is terminated either
by the employer voluntarily or by the PBGC, and is also underfunded, the PBGC will become
the trustee of the plan and will guarantee any nonforfeitable benefits. Id. §§ 1322-1322a.
90. See, e.g., Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis. L.
REV. 65, 65 (asserting that PBGC "finds itself on the brink of financial ruin" because many
insured pension plans are underfunded); J. Robert Suffoletta, Jr., Note, Who Should Pay When
Federally Insured Pension Funds Go Broke?: A Strategy For Recovering from the Wrongdoers, 65 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 308, 313 (1990) (estimating that deficit in all pension fund claims may soon
reach $10 billion); Edwin McDowell, U.S. Moves on Pan Am Pensions, N.Y. TiMES,July 25, 1991,
at D8 (stating that PBGC had assets of $3.3 billion and liabilities of $5.1 billion at end of fiscal
year 1990).
91. See, e.g., McDowell, supra note 90, at DI (reporting that in wake of Pan American
World Airways' (Pan Am) bankruptcy, PBGC determined that some of Pan Am's flight engi-
neers may receive reduced benefits because Pan Am's Cooperative Retirement Income Plan is
approximately $800 million underfunded and airline's defined benefit plan for flight engi-
neers is approximately $40 million underfunded).
92. See DeBondt & Thaler, supra note 50, at 793 (noting stock prices' tendency to over-
react upon surfacing of unexpected news or occurrence of dramatic geopolitical events); H.
Nejat Seyhun, Overreaction or Fundamentals: Some Lessons from Insiders' Response to the Crash of
1987, 45 J. FIN. 1363, 1386-87 (1990) (concluding that stock price shifts in months before
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as SRI to succeed at income maximization. In this regard, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that a hypothesis of market inefficiency im-
plies that the separation theorem does not hold93 and that SRI and
other "beat the market" strategies that operate from behind the effi-
ciency frontier may maximize income in direct contrast with the ex-
pectations of the CAPM.
94
In support of this "inefficiency hypothesis," the economist
MichaelJensen wrote more than ten years ago that despite his belief
that the efficient markets hypothesis was backed by strong empirical
evidence, economics was beginning to present new evidence that
was inconsistent with that hypothesis. 95 Since then several others,
most notably Robert Shiller,96 have also concluded that there is now
evidence available that questions the theoretical and empirical un-
derpinnings of the efficient markets hypothesis. 97 For example,
1987 market crash, during crash, and in subsequent months were based more firmly in over-
reaction to trends than in fundamental values changes); Jeremy Stein, Overreactions in the Op-
tions Market, 44J. FIN. 1011, 1012 (1989) (presenting evidence that price volatility of options
market exceeds rational expectations).
93. See HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 74, at 436 (stating that separation theorem only applies
where markets are efficient).
94. See supra notes 49-52 (suggesting that SRI could outperform market if markets are
inefficient and CAPM is invalid).
95. See Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Effiidency, 6 J. FIN.
ECON. 95, 95 (1978) (asserting that economics was "entering a stage where widely scattered
and as yet incohesive evidence is arising which seems to be inconsistent with the [efficient
market] theory").
96. Shiller, supra note 50, at 56-63 (demonstrating that many investment decisions are
premised on emotion or intuition and are not based on objective information).
97. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Val-
ues?, 41J. FIN. 591, 592 (1986) (asserting that "existing evidence does not establish that finan-
cial markets are efficient in the sense of rationally reflecting fundamentals").
The literature on the inefficiency of capital markets is now substantial. See, e.g., DYCKMAN &
MORSE, supra note 63, at 8 (stating that markets reflect inability of unsophisticated investors to
process information and make correct decisions); Black, supra note 50, at 531-32 (arguing that
many stock trades are not based on clear information and are therefore inefficient); Cutler et
al., supra note 50, at 9 (asserting that little variation in stock prices can be explained based
solely on publicly available investment information); DeBondt & Thaler, supra note 50, at 793
(stating that stock prices react irrationally to unexpected world events); Werner F.M. DeBondt
& Richard H. Thaler, Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction and Stock Market Sensationality, 42 J.
FIN. 557, 579 (1987) (suggesting that price shifts are tied to seasonal shifts and firm sizes);
Haugen et al., supra note 50, at 1006 (maintaining that volatility of stock prices is unrelated to
real economic events); Simon M. Keane, Paradox in the Current Crisis in Efficient Market Theory, J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 1991, at 30 (noting sharp criticism of efficient market hypothesis
that arose in financial circles after 1987 market crash and 1989 stock price volatility); Allan W.
Kleidon, Anomalies in Financial Economics: Blueprint for Change, 59 J. Bus. S469, S487 (1986)
(stating that anomalies in stock prices cannot be accommodated by existing efficiency theo-
ries); Lee et al., supra note 50, at 163 (casting doubt on efficient markets hypothesis by stating
that stock trades based on irrational beliefs can influence price); Bruce N. Lehmann, Fads,
Martingales, and Market Efficiency, 105 QJ. ECON. 1, 25 (1990) (examining security prices and
concluding that efficient markets hypothesis should be rejected as inadequate to predict
prices); Edward M. Miller, Bounded Efficient Markets: A New Wrinkle to the EMH, J. PORTFOLIO
MaMT., Summer 1987, at 12 (suggesting that changes to efficient markets hypothesis are
needed to reflect market realities); John O'Brien & Sanjay Srivastava, Dynamic Stock Markets
with Multiple Assets: An Experimental Analysis, 46J. FIN. 1811, 1811 (1991) (finding strong evi-
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Professors Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence Summers have noted that
investors tend to "chase the trend" by buying stocks after they rise
and selling them after they fall.98 By chasing trends rather than in-
vesting on the basis of fundamental information, investors create
speculative booms or "bubbles" that move prices away from funda-
mentals. Instead of counteracting this essentially false change in
prices as would happen under CAPM theory, arbitrageurs actually
participate in chasing trends because such an investment strategy is
profitable for short periods. 99 The participation of arbitrageurs
only exacerbates the boom, however. 100
Professors Shleifer and Summers suggest that such a boom scena-
rio makes it easier to explain the market crash of 1987. Under stan-
dard finance theory, argue the professors, the October 1987 crash
reflected either a large increase in risk premiums because of the
weakness of the economy or a large decrease in future growth rates
of dividends.101 There is no evidence, however, that risk increased
or dividend growth decreased. 10 2 The crash, therefore, can be at-
tributed to a collapse of positive feedback strategies, of which chas-
ing trends is one example.10 3
This creation of speculative bubbles is a form of investment via
dence against efficient markets hypothesis but concluding that tests do not support absolute
rejection of theory); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to
Finance,J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19 ("ITihe stock in the efficient market hypothesis-
at least as it has traditionally been formulated--crashed along with the rest of the market on
October 19, 1987. Its recovery has been less dramatic than that of the rest of the market.");
Stein, supra note 92, at 1012 (presenting evidence that price volatility of options market ex-
ceeds rational efficiency-based expectations); Jack L. Treynor, Market Efficiency and the Bean Jar
Experiment, FINANCIAL ANALYSTSJ., May-June 1987, at 50 ("Market efficiency is a premise, not a
conclusion. The finance literature offers no proof of market efficiency .... "); Langdon B.
Wheeler, The Oscillation of Systems: The Missing Link Between Price Volatility and Market Efficiency,
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 1989, at 7 (proposing revision to efficient markets hypothe-
sis in attempt to reconcile conflict between price volatility and market efficiency). But see Eu-
gene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1607-10 (1991) (arguing that
empirical studies of market efficiency are valuable despite disagreement among economists
over plausible conclusions).
98. See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 97, at 28 (observing that trend chasers follow
"positive feedback strategies" in which stock price levels and stock purchase volumes are
correlated).
99. See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 97, at 28 ("lIt may pay arbitrageurs to jump on
the bandwagon themselves. Arbitrageurs then optionally buy the stocks that positive feed-
back investors get interested in when their prices rise. When price increases feed the buying
of other investors, arbitrageurs sell out near the top and take their profits.").
100. Cf Shleifer & Summers, supra note 97, at 28 ("The effect of arbitrage is to stimulate
the interest of other investors and so to contribute to the movement of prices away from
fundamentals.").
101. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 97, at 28.
102. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 97, at 28 (observing that after 1987 crash, stock price
volatility "indeed jumped up but came back down rapidly as it usually does").
103. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 97, at 28 ("Positive feedback trading, exacerbated by
possible front-running by investment banks, can also explain the depth of the crash once it
had started.").
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the use of "popular," or non-CAPM, models. Professor Shiller ex-
amined the use of popular models in the context of the 1987 stock
market crash in the United States and Japan, the real estate booms
in the late 1980s, and periodic "hot" markets for initial public stock
offerings.10 4 He notes that what he calls the rational expectations
model, which is equivalent to the efficient markets hypothesis, is
problematic because it assumes "that people know (or behave as if
they know) the true model that describes the economy."' 10 5 He as-
serts that popular models, which economic actors use to form in-
vestment expectations, are not the same as models used by
economists.1 06 Professor Shiller concludes that certain speculative
booms and crashes such as the stock market crash in October 1987
can be explained in large part by the phenomenon of many inves-
tors using popular non-CAPM models to make investment
decisions. 107
Finally, Professor Summers examined statistical tests frequently
used by economists to assess the efficiency of capital markets and
concluded that the tests are not powerfully descriptive.108 He noted
that there is no evidence to suggest that efficient financial markets
rationally reflect fundamental investment information.' 0 9 Impor-
tantly, he described his results as casting doubt on the efficient mar-
kets hypothesis."10
As the foregoing examples indicate, a substantial amount of theo-
retical and empirical work in economics now suggests that the
nearly universal support enjoyed by the efficient markets hypothesis
has eroded. " ' The implication of this development is significant to
the debate over the validity of ethical investing. If capital markets
are not efficient then the separation theorem, which posits that in-
104. See Shiller, supra note 50, at 56-63 (demonstrating that pricing in speculative real
estate and stock market booms and crashes may be unrelated to fundamental economic
information).
105. Shiller, supra note 50, at 55.
106. Shiller, supra note 50, at 55.
107. See Shiller, supra note 50, at 64 (suggesting that popular pricing models may prove
more accurate than efficient markets hypothesis in predicting behavior of markets).
108. See Summers, supra note 97, at 593-98 (reviewing statistical tests of market efficiency).
109. See Summers, supra note 97, at 592 (examining statistical tests of speculative market
efficiency and concluding that "existing evidence does not establish that financial markets are
efficient in the sense of rationally reflecting fundamentals"); see also O'Brien & Srivastava,
supra note 97, at 1837 ("We found that the markets are generally inefficient from the point of
view of full information aggregation.").
110. See Summers, supra note 97, at 592 (stating that his results "call into question the
theoretical as well as empirical underpinnings of the Efficient Market Hypothesis"); see also
Haugen et al., supra note 50, at 1006 (noting that "[e]xcessive volatility of volatility which we
observe [in stock prices] only serves to raise further questions regarding our ability to account
fully for the behavior of stock prices through current financial markets paradigms").
11. See supra note 97 (reviewing criticisms of efficient markets hypothesis' validity).
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come is maximized by separating investment and consumption deci-
sions,1 12 does not apply, and SRI itself may be a vehicle for income
maximization.118 In an inefficient market, investors can take advan-
tage of speculative booms created by an irrational increase in de-
mand for certain investments. If ethical investors participated in
booms through social investing, they could maximize investment in-
come while engaging in consumption in direct contravention of the
separation theorem. In other words, the predictions of the CAPM
notwithstanding, investors could, from "behind the efficiency fron-
tier," both do good and do well at the same time.
3. Data on state specially targeted portfolio investments and certain private
funds
Because SRI has been performed over a long period of time and
has gained considerable attention and support among public enti-
ties such as politicians and unions, data regarding SRI's actual per-
formance in certain instances can be assembled. This section
contains the available data with respect to public pension funds. In
addition, the section briefly surveys the claims of certain private in-
vestment funds to extraordinary performance despite the predic-
tions of the CAPM and the efficient markets hypothesis.
One means of resolving the continuing controversy over whether
SRI negatively affects fund performance is to put aside theory,
which on balance favors opponents of SRI, and to set about measur-
ing the performance of various funds. In other words, this is one
dispute that appears amenable to empirical resolution. Assessing
performance, though, is not a simple task. Some hurdles that must
be overcome include the construction of appropriate benchmarks
and timescales and the problem of measuring the performance of
one investor against another.'1 4 In her recent survey of SRI, Anne
Simpson concluded that the ethical criteria, investment manage-
ment, and benchmarks employed will all affect the outcome of any
analysis of ethical investment.'15 At least one scholar has stated that
the available evidence does not entirely support social investing." 16
112. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining separation theorem and its im-
plications for socially responsible investments).
113. See supra note 47 (reviewing assertions by proponents of socially responsible invest-
ing that economic growth and returns under this kind of investing compare favorably to tradi-
tional market performance).
114. SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 86.
115. SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 96.
116. Joel Chernoff, War of Conscience Tuggingat Pension Funds, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE,
Nov. 27, 1989, at 3 (quoting Associate Dean Bernard Jump, Jr. of Maxwell School of Citizen-
ship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University).
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The following is a schematic summary of the performance of
some of the better-known social investment mutual funds during
1991 and 1992.117 Data about the performance of the Standard &
Poor's (S & P) 500,118 the DowJones Industrials,1 19 and the average
of all mutual funds is included for comparison.
117. The Social Investment Forum provided this comparative data. Pax World Fund, or-
ganized in 1970, describes itself as devoted to "mak(ing] a contribution to world peace" by
investing in firms with fair employment practices and sound environmental policies in non-
war related industries, and by avoiding the liquor, tobacco, and gambling industries. PAX
WORLD FUND, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT PAX WORLD FUND (1990). The Calvert Social
Investment Fund actually consists of four different portfolios, each devoted to companies that
"support their workers, provide opportunities for women and minorities, and deliver safe
products and services in ways that sustain our natural environment." CALVERT GROUP, CAL-
VERT SOCIAL INVESTMENT FUND: COMMONLY ASKED QUESTIONS (1989). The Fund will not in-
vest in companies that engage in business activities with oppressive regimes, such as that in
South Africa, or manufacture weapons systems, or produce nuclear energy. Id. The Parnas-
sus Fund describes itself as following a "contrarian" policy of investing in stocks that are
undervalued because they are considered disfavored by the financial community. See THE
PARNASSUS FUND, WHY Is THE PARNASSUS FUND DIFFERENT FROM ALL TiE OTHER MUTUAL
FUNDS ON THE MARKET TODAY? (defining contrarian as "the art of buying what other people
don't want"). The New Alternatives Fund concentrates on environmentally oriented energy
investments and favors recycling, clean water, cogeneration, and reducing the greenhouse
effect while disfavoring tobacco, gambling, weapons, and nuclear energy. NEW ALTERNATIVES
FUND, WHY INVEST IN NEW ALTERNATIVES? 5 (1989). The Dreyfus Third Century Fund is a
common stock fund that avoids investments with South African ties and seeks out companies
that protect the environment and the health and safety of workers, that produce safe products,
and that support equal opportunity. THE DREYFUS THIRD CENTURY FUND, INC., PROSPECTUS 3
(1990); THE DREYFUS THIRD CENTURY FUND, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (1989). The Calvert-
Ariel Appreciation Fund seeks to invest in companies that take steps to preserve the environ-
ment, and will not invest in companies that do business in South Africa. CALVERT GROUP,
CALVERT-ARIEL APPRECIATION FUND: AN ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND INVESTMENT (1989).
118. See SUMNER N. LEVINE, THE FINANCIAL ANALYST'S HANDBOOK 88-89 (2d ed. 1988)
(explaining that Standard & Poor's 500 (S & P 500) is generally used as indicator of trends in
stock market). The S & P 500 index tracks 500 stocks, including 400 industrial companies, 20
transportation companies, 40 utilities, and 40 financial companies, that are chosen for their
representativeness of the broader stock market so that the index theoretically highlights
trends on the broader market. Id. Some stocks influence the market more than others, so the
index attempts to compensate for this by giving more influential stocks greater weight in mar-
ket forecast calculations. Id.
119. See RICHARD S. WURMAN ET AL., THE WALL STREETJOURNAL: GUIDE TO UNDERSTAND-
ING MONEY & MARKETS 32 (1989) (noting that Dow Jones Industrials is index designed to
measure stock market movements of 30 major industrial companies). A movement up or
down in the stock price of one of these indicator companies will theoretically be a reflection of
an analogous movement in the broader market. Id. at 32-33.
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TABLE I
SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE MU-rUAL FUND PERFORMANCE
Percentage Appreciation of Total Reinvested Monies
Average
Individual Individual Performance
Fund Average Performance Fund of Group
1 year ending of Group 1 year ending 5 years ending 5 years ending
Assets Fund Name 6/30/92 6/30/92 6/30/92 6/30/92
(Smil)
255 Calvert-Ariel Growth 10.07% 14.05% 81.77% 49.257
(closed to new sales) (94 small co growth funds)
130 Calvert-Ariel 7.31 14.05 49.25
Appreciation (94 small co growth funds)
44 Calvert Social Bond 13.29 14.57 53.81
(633 fixed funds)
58 Calvert Social Equity 4A6 11.99 48.16
(271 growth funds)
387 Calvert Social 9.01 13A2 42.50 54A6
Managed Growth (72 balanced funds)
6 Domini Social Index 12.21 12.93 49.52
Trust (228 growth & income
funds)
444 Dreyfus Third Century 5.78 11.99 57.22 48.16
(271 growth funds)
8 Muir California Tax 11.84 11.29 51.43
Free Fund (66 CA municipal funds)
24 New Alternatives 2.28 0.88 43.20 13.20
(23 natural resources
funds)
39 Parnassus 21.82 11.99 34.95 48.16
1 (271 growth funds)
368 Pax World 6.93 13.42 61.59 54.46
(72 balanced funds)
6 Rightime Social 4.49 14.74 43.34
Awareness (21 specialty funds)
3 Schield: Progressive -17.19 -9.09
Environmental (6 environmental funds)
Information provided by the Social Investment Forum
Source: Lipper Fund Listings, BARRONS, July 27, 1992, at M24-M56.
Dow Tones Industrials 17.66 64A2
S & P 500 13.39 59.02
Average All Mutual 12.89 47.50
Funds (2990 total)
Source: Fixed Income Funds, 2nd Quarter Results, BARRO'S, July 27, 1992, at M23.
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TABLE 2
SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE
Percentage Appreciation of Total Reinvested Monies
Average
Individual Individual Performance
Fund Average Performance Fund of Group
1 year ending of Group 1 year ending 5 years ending 5 years ending
Assets Fund Name 6/30/91 6/30/91 6/30/91 6/30/91
($mil)
248 Calvert-Ariel Growth 0.53% 4.86% 36.81%
(closed to new sales) (87 small co growth funds)
48 Calvert-Ariel 8.96 4.86 36.81
Appreciation (87 small co growth funds)
30 Calvert Social Bond 10.19 9.28 40.64
(545 fixed funds)
37 Calvert Social Equity 5.15 5.17 51.07
(267 growth funds)
305 Calvert Social 7.11 7.79 42.101 51.34
Managed Growth (65 balanced funds)
260 Dreyfus Third Century 11.01 5.17 77.10 51.07
(267 growth funds)
21 New Alternatives 5.94 -3.94 61.77 66.12
(19 natural resources
funds)
22 Parnassus 3.82 5.17 33.66 51.07
(267 growth funds)
179 Pax World 14.79 7.79 63.92 51.34
(65 balanced funds)
6 Rightime Social 6A9 3.04 45.54
Awareness (31 specialty funds)
4 Schield: Progressive -1.41 8.57
Environmental (5 environmental funds)
Information provided by the Social Investment Forum
Source: L per Fund Listings, BARRON'S, Aug. 12, 1991, at M20-M51.
Dow Jones Industrials 4.64 84.70
S & P 500 7.38 75.55
Average All Mutual 5.22 47.65
Funds (1880 total)
Source: Fixed Income Funds, 2nd Quarter Results, BARRON's, Aug. 12, 1991, at M18.
For the year ending on June 30, 1991, eight of the SRI funds out-
performed the Dow Jones Industrials; four outperformed the S & P
500; and seven outperformed the average for all mutual funds. For
the five-year period ending on the same date, none of the funds out-
performed the Dow Jones; one outperformed the S & P 500; and
three outperformed the average for all mutual funds. For the year
ending on June 30, 1992, one of the funds outperformed the Dow
Jones Industrials; one outperformed the S & P 500; and two out-
performed the average for all mutual funds. For the five year period
ending on the same date, one of the funds outperformed the Dow
Jones index; two outperformed the S & P 500; and three out-
performed the average for all mutual funds.
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These results are consonant with the efficient markets hypothesis
to the extent that as a group, the SRI funds do not appear to "beat"
the traditional market consistently. It is impossible to account pre-
cisely for the funds' varied performances, but the fact that some
funds outperformed the market may be further evidence in support
of the inefficiency hypothesis. 120 In other words, certain SRI tech-
niques may unconsciously follow speculative booms in the market.
The above-listed data for several of the funds supports such an
interpretation.
Private funds are not the only source of data demonstrating the
effect of SRI on profitability. Many state and local governments
have considerable experience with the investment of public pension
fund monies into "targeted investments." Targeted investments are
generally restricted to a particular geographic area, usually a state
or municipality, and are often intended to foster home ownership or
to create jobs for specific groups of workers, typically unionized em-
ployees, in that geographic area.121 Measuring the performance of
these investments is complicated because it is difficult to determine
whether, but for the investment, jobs would have been created or
homes purchased. In addition, a public fund cannot consider itself a
success at increasing home ownership or creating jobs if it makes
loans that would have been made by other entities in the target area.
That is, if public pension funds are indeed investing in projects that
non-SRI investors are not, then those investments are probably ac-
companied by a high level of risk.122 If, on the other hand, the level
120. See supra notes 92-113 and accompanying text (discussing inefficiency market
hypothesis).
121. The following state statutes explicitly authorize targeted investments: ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 24-3-414(b), (d) (Michie 1987) (specifying that not less than 5%o nor more than 10O
of state-sponsored investments shall be Arkansas related); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 20205.7 (Deer-
ing Supp. 1992) (giving priority to investments related to residential realty within state);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-51-206(1) (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-13d(a) (West 1988); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 215.47(2)(a) (West 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, 1-113 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-10-1.7-2 (West 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 12.44 (West Supp.
1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.650(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 32, § 23(d) (West Supp. 1992); MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 38.1133(3)(e) (West 1985);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-11-121(1) (1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.689 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (es-
tablishing 3%o minimum and 5%o maximum for state-sponsored investment in small busi-
nesses with over 50% of assets or employees in state); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100-A.151-b
(1990) (encouraging investment in home mortgage market for members and state citizens up
to 10%o maximum); N.Y. RMIRE. & Soc. SEC. LAW § 177(7)(b) (McKinney 1987); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 145.11 (Anderson 1990); see also TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 70(g) (stating that all
state-sponsored investments "shall be directly related to the creation, retention, or expansion
of employment opportunity and economic growth in Texas").
122. See Kathleen Paisley, Public Pension Funds: The Need for Federal Regulation of Trustee In-
vestment Decisions, 4 YALE L. & PoLy REV. 188, 199 (1985) (stating that targeted local invest-
ments serve legitimate political goals but subject fund participants to increased risk or lower
returns).
1992]
32 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
of nonsystematic risk involved in these investments is comparable to
that of other funds, then it is hard to believe that these specially
targeted investments would not have been made anyway.
At a recent conference entitled "Economically Targeted Invest-
ments by Public Pension Funds" held at Albany Law School, Eliza-
beth Holtzman, Comptroller of New York City, reviewed the
performance of specially targeted investments by public funds in
New York. 123 New York City's five pension funds are valued at ap-
proximately $38 billion,124 and about two percent or $800 million of
these funds have been allocated for specially targeted investments,
with a goal of four percent to be reached in the near future. 125
Comptroller Holtzman insisted that although targeted investments
earn a market rate of return, the capital provided by the funds
should be invested in areas not otherwise served by the markets.' 26
She proffered the following example:
I had a very moving moment ... that related to a ... targeted
investment program of the comptroller's office. In December,
1990, I was able to hand Sandra and Santiago Torres the key to a
newly rehabilitated apartment on 115th Street in Harlem. It was
the 25,000th apartment made available through a targeted invest-
ment program of three New York City pension funds .... 127
At a theoretical level, it is hard to understand how these invest-
ments could consistently earn a market rate of return, as Comptrol-
ler Holtzman claimed they do, if they involve committing capital in
ways and places that the market considers less than maximally prof-
itable. In New York, however, the participants' principal is not in
jeopardy because organizations such as the Small Business Associa-
tion, the State of New York Mortgage Association, the Government
National Mortgage Association, the Federal National Mortgage As-
sociation, and others act as insurers for the city's targeted
investments. 1'2 8
While Comptroller Holtzman's assessment of the New York expe-
rience is strong on anecdote, it lacks concrete data to support the
claim that equal or higher returns are possible without an increase
in nonsystematic risk. Indeed, if Holtzman's description of the New
123. Elizabeth Holtzman, The Center for New York City's Targeted Investment Pro-
grams, Remarks at the Government Law Center of Albany Law School (Mar. 1, 1991), in
ECONOMICALLY TARGETED INVESTMENTS BY PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS 29, 29 (Government Law
Center of Albany Law School ed., 1991).
124. Id. at 33.
125. Idt at 34.
126. Id. at 34-35.
127. Id. at 39.
128. Id. at 34.
[Vol. 42:1
1992] SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING
York experience is taken at face value, it leads to the conclusion that
public pension monies can be used in conjunction with government
programs to engage in political philanthropy at no cost. This is sim-
ply illogical if the efficient markets hypothesis holds true. Publicly
targeted investment may be a successful strategy, however, at least
for a while, if the efficiency hypothesis is not always an accurate de-
scription of the way markets function.
A number of individuals and organizations have taken the posi-
tion that greater control by unions over public and Taft-Hartley 129
pension funds should be encouraged because such control would
lead to an increase in specially targeted investments.130 Perhaps the
best known proponents of this view are Jeremy Rifkin and Randy
Barber, who argued forcefully in 1978 in favor of increased union
domination of pension investment decisions.' 3 ' This idea, since ex-
pounded by others, 3 2 is nearly the same as that described by Comp-
troller Holtzman. The major difference is that the unions favoring
this tactic expressly seek increased political power'33 and under-
stand "specially targeted" to mean investments that would increase
their present wage-earning capacity by directing capital toward un-
ionized projects and companies.' 3 4
129. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1988) (codifying § 302(c)(5)(B) of Taft-Hartley Act)
(authorizing creation of pension funds that are jointly administered by employer and union).
130. See Paul J. Wessel,Job Creation for Union Members Through Pension Fund Investment, 35
BUFF. L. REV. 323, 362-63 (1986) (concluding that union pension funds are "largely untapped
resource" that can be used to create union jobs and preserve union power); Deborah G. Ol-
son, Keeping Capital and Jobs at Home, 8 NOVA L. REV. 583, 596 (1984) (promoting U.S. worker
control over pension investment decisions and capital assets as means to arrest incidence of
capital flight to countries where workers are paid lower wages than in U.S.).
131. See RiFxiN & BARBER, supra note 14, at 10-13 (summarizing proposal that unions
should end corporate and bank use of pension funds to cripple organized labor activities).
132. See AFL-CIO, INVEsTMENr OF UNION PENSION FUNDS iii (1980) (encouraging union
participation in pension fund management in order to increase employment, advance "social
purposes such as worker housing and health centers," assist workers in asserting their rights
by increasing cooperative action, and exclude investment in companies with policies hostile to
workers' rights); AFL-CIO, PENSIONS: A STUDY OF BENEFIT FUND INVESTMENT POLICES 3
(1980) (surveying investment practices of benefit funds for 10 large industrial companies and
noting that funds "often heavily invested in non-union firms and firms with high overseas
employment," thereby hurting long-term interests of fund beneficiaries);Joel H. Siegal, Power
in the Nineties: An Analysis of the Management of Pension Funds for the Attainment of Union and Public
Interest Goals, 1987 DET. C.L. REV. 673, 697 (concluding that union control over pension funds
could provide organized labor with "potentially the most powerful instrument for social
change in the country").
133. See Siegal, supra note 132, at 697-98 (arguing that economic power base of unions
can be used to influence "socio-economic policies in favor of the ideals and philosophies
espoused by organized labor").
134. See Wessel, supra note 130, at 354 (finding significant shift toward investments with
guaranteed use of union labor by construction union pension funds seeking to maintain union
membership). For example, investment by union pension funds in unionized companies and
companies that do not have extensive overseas operations is a blatant attempt to create and
preserve union jobs. There is nothing objectionable about organizations acting to enhance
the well-being of their members. Pension investments, however, are supposed to provide for
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This political tactic, masquerading as "investment analysis," has
sparked a vigorous debate. 3 5 For instance, the recent revelation of
the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System pension fund's dis-
mal investment performance is likely to trigger a badly needed reas-
sessment of the attractiveness of SRI and special targets such as
housing. Essentially, the Kansas fund invested aggressively in
"backyard" targets that were designed to generate benefits close to
home.'36 Specifically, in 1985, the fund began investing in Kansas
businesses that were unable to get credit elsewhere.13 7 Unfortu-
nately, these investments increased the risk assumed by the fund to
such an extent that the fund became unprofitable.13 8 In fact, state
auditors have suggested that the Kansas fund's losses may soon
reach $200 million.' 3 9 This result can be explained by the fund's
apparent gross departure from basic diversification principles of in-
vestment. 40 It is important to understand that the evidence in sup-
port of the inefficiency hypothesis is not a simultaneous attack on
the principle of diversification: there is no evidence that the diver-
sity principle is unsound. On the contrary, Kansas' experience
should reaffirm diversity's central role in portfolio creation.
Although somewhat limited, the available evidence on SRI by pri-
vate funds, public employee union funds, and Taft-Hartley funds
suggests that the rosy scenario of comparable gain without in-
creased nonsystematic risk is likely only when the market is not func-
tioning efficiently. Some funds have performed well and others
have not. 14 1 The inefficiency hypothesis provides a reason to be-
future income, not current wages. Of course, not all noneconomic value choices involve ob-
jectionable self-dealing of this kind. See generally infra notes 176-2 10 and accompanying text
(discussing legality of socially responsible investing and difficulty of distinguishing permissi-
ble noneconomic investment criteria from impermissible self-dealing).
135. Compare RICHARD BLODGETF, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: UNION PENSION FUND ASSET
MANAGEMENT 50-51 (1977) (applauding targeted investment of union pension funds in home
construction industry that created jobs for union members) with EDWIN VIEIRA, JR., 'SOCIAL
INVESTING': ITS CHARACTER, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND LEGALITY UNDER THE EMPLOYEE RE-
TIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 12-14 (1983) (criticizing union pension fund invest-
ment in construction, manufacturing, and other traditional union industries that have
dwindling investment in modem high technology businesses with higher economic potential).
136. James A. White, Back-Yard Investing Yields Big Losses, Roils Kansas Pension System, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 21, 1991, atAl.
137. Id. at A4.
138. Id. It is interesting to note that except for the many types of mortgage insurance
available in New York state, this description of backyard investing would apply to the kinds of
investments made in New York that Comptroller Holtzman described. See supra notes 123-28
and accompanying text (presenting successful New York experience of backyard investment in
low-income apartment rehabilitation).
139. White, supra note 136, at Al.
140. See supra notes 56, 65-69 (discussing effect of diversification on portfolio's amount of
risk and return).
141. See supra Table 1 accompanying notes 117-19 (showing that Parnassus Fund out-
performed market in 1992 whereas Calvert Social Equity Fund, Dreyfus Third Century Fund,
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lieve that those funds that have outperformed the S & P 500 might
continue to do so in the future. 142 In an efficient market, however,
one would expect to see more crises of the magnitude facing the
managers and participants of the Kansas fund, because it cannot be
true that specially targeted investments will be as attractive as tradi-
tional investments. If the rate of return is comparable for both, it
must be because the level of diversifiable risk is relatively high for
the targeted investments. 143
4. Are some screens proxies for modem portfolio theory choices?
In spite of the fact that the data provided above is generally incon-
clusive, it is hard to ignore the more concrete fact that, at least in the
short run, some socially responsible funds have performed very
well. 144 Assume for a moment, however, that a given social or polit-
ical fund is able to match or better the performance of the S & P
500.145 Would this mean that the reduced investment pool available
to SRI investors did not increase nonsystematic risk or lead to a
lower return? Possibly not. Careful examination of many of the
screens employed by SRI managers suggests that in some cases a
screen may operate as a proxy for the kind of inquiries about risk
that a traditional fund manager would make.' 46 As a result, it may
be true under certain political conditions that companies with so-
cially responsible business practices will outperform their less re-
sponsible counterparts.' 4
7
Consider the case of a fund that avoids South Africa-related in-
New Alternatives Fund, Pax World Fund, Rightime Social Awareness Fund, and Schield Pro-
gressive Environmental Fund performed poorly); see also supra Table 2 accompanying notes
117-19 (showing that Calvert-Ariel Appreciation Fund, Calvert Social Bond Fund, Dreyfus
Third Century Fund, and Pax World Fund outperformed market in 1991 whereas Parnassus
Fund performed poorly).
142. See supra notes 92-113 and accompanying text (discussing theoretical and empirical
support for inefficiency market hypothesis); see also supra Tables 1, 2 accompanying notes 117-
19 (showing that Parnassus Fund outperformed S & P 500 in 1992 and that Calvert-Ariel
Appreciation Fund, Calvert Social Bond Fund, Dreyfus Third Century Fund, and Pax World
Fund outperformed S & P 500 in 1991).
143. Paisley, supra note 122, at 199.
144. See supra Table I accompanying notes 117-19. Note that the average performance,
measured in percentage appreciation of total reinvested monies, of the Calvert-Ariel Growth
Fund (81.77) and the Pax World Fund (61.59) each exceeded the S & P 500 average (59.02)
over the five-year period ending in 1992. Id.
145. Of course, this assumption is not necessarily inconsistent with the CAPM and the
efficient markets hypothesis because in the short run, a pension plan manager practicing SRI
is more likely to outperform the market.
146. See, e.g., Valerie A. Zondorak, A New Face in Corporate Environmental Responsibility: The
Valdez Prindples, 18 B.C. ENvmr. Arr. L. REV. 457, 484 (1991) (finding that corporate manage-
ment's adherence to ethical principles may improve corporate credibility, attract investment,
and strengthen company competitiveness).
147. JuDn, supra note 5, at 13.
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vestments. In October 1989, Pensions & Investment Age reported that
South Africa-free portfolios outperformed other investment portfo-
lios over a long period of time.148 One explanation for this result is
the apparently superior investment abilities of the managers of
funds that screen out companies with ties to South Africa. 149 An-
other equally plausible explanation is that as the political furor over
South Africa intensified during the 1980s, the South Africa screen
became a proxy for avoiding a high risk investment. In other words,
economic and social turbulence attending the imposition and lifting
of international sanctions on South Africa discouraged even tradi-
tional investments in corporations with ties to that country. 150
The South Africa experience suggests that the more popular sup-
port a screen has and the more compliance it generates, the more
likely it is to serve as a proxy for avoiding an investment that would
also be unattractive on traditional grounds. As more foreign com-
panies disinvested in South Africa and the nation's economy deteri-
orated, the independent desirability of investing there also
declined.' 5 ' Therefore, because of the efforts of divestment propo-
nents, South Africa may now be an unattractive place to invest re-
gardless of one's views about apartheid.
The same dynamic may be at work in the case of funds that have
used positive screens to invest in environmentally conscious, or
"green," companies. The Parnassus Fund, as one example, might
continue to outperform the DowJones Industrials 5 2 if "green" is in
fact a proxy for unusually prudent management and more efficient
production processes. Also, if being environmentally conscious in-
creases a company's attractiveness to consumers, which being a sig-
natory to the Valdez Principles may achieve,' 53 then environmental
consciousness may also translate into increased demand for a com-
pany's product and better stock performance. It is important to
note, however, that any particular screen's advantage will disappear
as soon as a dynamic of this type becomes clear to traditional inves-
tors. In an efficient market, this is the only sense in which SRI may
enable an investor to do good and do well at the same time.
148. South Africa-Free Portfolios, supra note 3, at 40.
149. South Africa-Free Portfolios, supra note 3, at 40.
150. Businesses Avoid South Africa Ties, supra note 7, at C8.
151. See Ann-Catherine Blank, Comment, The South African Divestment Debate: Factoring
"Political Risk" into the Prudent Investor Rule, 55 U. CINN. L. REv. 201, 215 n.63 (1986) (finding
unrest in South Africa lowered profit projections for companies doing business in that
nation).
152. See supra Table 1 accompanying notes 117-19 (showing that Parnassus Fund (21.82)
outperformed DowJones Industrials (17.66) for one year period ending 6/30/92).
153. See supra note 30 (describing origin and purpose of Valdez Principles).
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II. PENSION FUNDS, SRI, AND THE LAW
A. The Basic Legal Framework for Pension Investing
1. Pre-ERISA
Prior to 1974, the year ERISA was enacted,154 the common law of
trusts, the Taft-Hartley Act, 155 and portions of the Internal Revenue
Code delineated the permissible scope of trustee behavior with re-
spect to pension investment decisions. 15 6 State common law doc-
trine required trustees "to make such investments and only such
investments as a prudent man would make of his own property hav-
ing in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regu-
larity of the income to be derived."' 157 This prudent man or prudent
person 58 rule was first articulated in the United States in the fa-
mous case of Harvard College v. Amory.' 59 In addition, the common
law imposed on the trustee a duty of loyalty and prohibited self-
dealing and conflicts of interest.' 60 The fiduciary could not enter
154. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
646 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, and 29 U.S.C.).
155. Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Star. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
156. See Charles M. Dyke, Note, Warren v. Society National Bank: Fiduciary Duties and Re-
covery of Damages for Breach Under ERISA, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 515, 533-34 (1992) (discussing
pension plan regulation by means of tax deductions and deferments available to qualified
benefit plans).
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959); see also infra note 159 and accompa-
nying text (explaining Massachusetts Supreme Court case of Harvard College v. Amory that in-
troduced prudent person standard to American jurisprudence).
158. The prudent man standard is occasionally referred to in popular literature as the
"prudent person" standard or the "prudence rule." See, e.g., H. Ward Classen,Judicial Inter-
vention in Contractual Relationships Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Common Law, 42 S.C. L.
REv. 379, 411-14 (1991) (discussing reasonably prudent person standard); Paul G. Haskell,
The Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment and Modern Portfolio Theory, 69 N.C. L. REv. 87, 90,
105 (1990) (invoking prudent person principle and prudence rule); Michael W. Melton, Demy-
thologizing ESOPs, 45 TAx L. REv. 363, 389 n.128 (1990) (citing prudence rule).
159. 26 Mass. 446 (1830). Francis Amory had been designated to manage a sum of
$50,000 for the benefit of Harvard College and Massachusetts General Hospital, but he lost
$20,000 of the trust corpus through unprofitable investments. Id at 446-51. Harvard sued
on the ground that Amory had been imprudent in choosing to invest the money in manufac-
turing and insurance stocks that were riskier than public securities and other investments. Id.
at 459-61. The Massachusetts court found in favor of Amory, noting that a trustee is required
to exercise sound discretion and act as a reasonably prudent and intelligent person in manag-
ing the financial matters of the investment fund. Id at 461.
160. See, e.g., Pickering v. El Jay Equip. Co., 700 P.2d 134, 140 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985)
(discussing common law duty of loyalty); Goldman v. Rubin, 441 A.2d 713, 720 (Md. 1982)
(commenting on standard of duty of loyalty and conflict of interest); Riley v. Rockwell, 747
P.2d 903, 905 (Nev. 1987) (discussing problems concerning conflict of interest); Bank of Ne-
vada v. Speirs, 603 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Nev. 1979) (describing concerns and problems with
practice of self-dealing), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980); Bartlett v. Dumaine, 523 A.2d 1, 13
(N.H. 1986) (commenting on need to avoid conflict of interest); Estate of McCredy, 470 A.2d
585, 597 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (discussing possible problems with duty of loyalty, self-dealing,
and conflict of interest where trustee had interest in securities purchased for trust); Wheeler
v. Mann, 763 P.2d 758, 759-60 (Utah 1988) (finding that situation where trust assets were
invested in companies managed by trustee offended principles of self-dealing and duty of
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into transactions with the trust or compete with the trust res. 1' 1
The Taft-Hartley Act, which governs pension plans established
jointly by a union and one or more employers in multi-employer
plans, requires that the trust be "for the sole and exclusive benefit
of the employees of such employer, and their families and depen-
dents." 162 The Act permits employer contributions to the fund only
when various conditions designed to avoid diversion of funds to the
union or its officers are satisfied.
16 3
The third major source of pre-ERISA law governing the behavior
of fiduciaries is the Internal Revenue Code, which has a similar "ex-
clusive benefit" rule to that of the Taft-Hartley Act. An employer's
plan will not qualify for tax exempt status unless it is maintained for
the exclusive benefit of employees or their beneficiaries.' 64 Gener-
ally, courts have not stringently enforced the IRS exclusive benefit
rule. 16 5 Indeed, the IRS itself has declined to penalize investments
that generate collateral benefits for others, so long as the primary
purpose of an investment is to benefit employees and their
beneficiaries. 1
66
2. The fiduciary standards of ERISA
The passage of ERISA represented the culmination of years of
congressional hearings and aggressive lobbying by a variety of par-
ties that expected to be affected by the Federal Government's first
loyalty); Wilkins v. Lasater, 733 P.2d 221, 227 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (describing situations
where duty of loyalty is breached).
161. See, e.g., Pickering, 700 P.2d at 140 (holding that competing with trust beneficiary vio-
lates trustee's duty of loyalty); Estate of McCredy, 470 A.2d at 598 (discussing potential conflict
of interest where trustee had substantial personal interest in securities purchased for trust);
Wheeler, 763 P.2d at 760 (finding that trustee's investment of trust assets in companies he
managed and substantially owned violated duty of loyalty); Wilkins, 733 P.2d at 227 (stating
that trustee generally breaches duty of loyalty by leasing trust land for self).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1988) (codifying § 302(c)(5)(A) of Taft-Hartley Act). The Act
also requires that union pension funds be administered by equal numbers of representatives
of labor and management, although there are provisions for the designation of mutually ac-
ceptable third party representatives. Id. § 186(c)(5)(B).
163. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1988) (requiring detailed written agreement governing
trust payments, equal representation of employers and employees in administration, and an-
nual audit of trust fund as conditions on fund's acceptance of employer contributions).
164. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1988). An employer whose plan qualifies is entitled to deduct con-
tributions to the plan as ordinary and necessary business expenses. Id. § 404(a). In addition,
the participant may defer payment of taxes until receipt of benefits. Id. §§ 402(a)(1),
403(a)(1).
165. See Shelby U.S. Distribs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 874, 885 (1979) (finding that
incidental benefit to third party did not justify disqualification of plan); se,? also Wessel, supra
note 130, at 333 ("Since 1974, the [I.R.C.] has not been invoked by courts to impose fiduciary
standards separate from ERISA, but its detailed requirements for qualification still apply.").
166. See generally James D. Hutchinson & Charles G. Cole, Legal Standards Governing Invest-
ment of Pension Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1340, 1347-48 (1980)
(discussing Internal Revenue Service's broad application of exclusive benefit rule).
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attempt to comprehensively regulate private pensions.' 67 ERISA's
fiduciary standards, however, are dearly rooted in the common law
and pre-ERISA regulatory schemes already described. ERISA de-
fines a "fiduciary" as anyone with discretionary authority or control
with respect to a pension plan's assets or management.' 68 Thus,
plan trustees, investment managers, and those supplying advice in
exchange for compensation are clearly considered fiduciaries under
ERISA.' 6
9
As fiduciaries, trustees, investment managers, and investment ad-
visors are governed by both the general ERISA standard of section
404170 and the "prohibited transaction" rules of section 406.171
Section 404(a) provides a statutory formulation of the prudent per-
son rule in pension management.' 72 There is general agreement
that Congress intended this rule to be somewhat more flexible in
the ERISA context than as applied through the common law. 173
167. See Camilla E. Watson, Broken Promises Revisited. The Window of Vulnerability for Surviv-
ing Spouses UnderERISA, 76 IowA L. REv. 431,433-35 (1991) (recounting history of passage of
ERISA).
168. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988) (codifying ERISA § 3(21)(A)). The Act provides:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he [or she] exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of
its assets, (ii) he (or she] renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation,
direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has
any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he [or she] has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
Il
169. Id.
170. See id. § 1104(a) (establishing prudent person standard of care for pension plan fidu-
ciaries, including investment diversification requirement and trustee's duty of loyalty to pen-
sion beneficiaries).
171. See id. § 1106 (establishing general prohibition on transactions between pension plan
and fiduciary or party in interest and on transfers of property to pension plan by party in
interest).
172. Id. § 1104(a) (codifying ERISA § 404(a)). The statutory formulation of the prudent
person rule in pension management states:
a fiduciary shall discharge his [or her] duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then pre-
vailing that a prudent [person] acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as
such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this
subchapter.
Id. § 1104(a)(1) (codifying ERISA § 404(a)(1)).
173. See Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that flexi-
ble ERISA prudence rule takes circumstances into account and does not establish rigorous
"prudent expert" standard of common law); see also Samuel D. Cheris, Making Responsible In-
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Specifically, the Department of Labor has rejected the common law
approach to examining a particular investment for prudence only in
terms of relative risk and has followed analysis of the investment as
part of the entire portfolio. 174 But, as in the common law, an ERISA
fiduciary is also bound by a duty of loyalty and must behave "solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" in the adminis-
tration of a pension fund. 175
B. Is SRI Illegal?
These twin obligations of the ERISA fiduciary, the duties of loy-
alty and of prudence, form the crux of the debate concerning the
propriety of ethical investing. Opponents of SRI argue vigorously
that SRI practitioners violate these two duties whenever a trustee
favors a social cause over the beneficiaries' financial gain. 176 SRI
supporters, on the other hand, insist either that SRI involves no fi-
nancial sacrifice and therefore no breach of the duties of loyalty or
prudence exists, or they argue that small losses in exchange for the
satisfaction of ethical investing are permitted under ERISA. 177
Although decided in 1971 and therefore predating ERISA, the
case of Blankenship v. Boyle178 is nonetheless a useful starting point
for legal analysis of this issue. The court in Blankenship applied the
common law duty of loyalty to enjoin a type of social investing. 79
In the case, a group of pension fund trustees, dominated by a coal
union, deposited plan assets into a union-owned bank in a non-in-
terest bearing account, and also invested sums in public utilities to
try to force the utilities to purchase union-mined coal.180 These ac-
tions were a kind of social investment in that the trustees considered
factors other than risk, return, diversification, and protection of
pension assets in deciding what investments to make.' 8 ' The court
vestment Decisions in Light of the Evolving Pudent Person Rule, 14 EsT. PLAN. 338, 340 (1987)
("Congress adopted the [ERISA prudence standard] after hearing extensive testimony which
demonstrated that the [common law] prudent person rule was far too rigid for judging man-
agers of employee benefit funds.").
174. See Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 166, at 1356 (explaining Department of Labor's
position that "[t]he fiduciary will be considered . . . to be in compliance when he [or she]
considers not only the possibility of capital gain or loss and probable investment income, but
also such criteria as diversification [and] liquidity").
175. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988) (codifying ERISA § 404(a)(1)).
176. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 3, at 16 (arguing that duty of loyalty and prudent per-
son rule are violated whenever pension plan trustee "sacrifices the beneficiary's financial well-
being for any cause").
177. See, e.g., Zondorak, supra note 146, at 482 (stating that socially responsible investing
is competitive alternative that no longer necessitates profit sacrifice).
178. 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971).
179. Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (D.D.C. 1971).
180. Id. at 1095-96, 1105-06.
181. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (comparing SRI's variety of decision-
[Vol. 42:1
1992] SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 41
enjoined.the trustees from operating the pension fund for the bene-
fit of the union or the coal miners18 2 and remarked that this was a
"clear case of self-dealing" by the union and management repre-
sentatives. 183 The court in Blankenship expressly recognized that the
challenged investment practices had benefited the workers in that
they were better off with a union that had enhanced its own power
via these social investments.' 8 4 The case can therefore be inter-
preted as hostile to the notion that fiduciaries may trade long-term
pension security for short-term political gains. 185
There is considerably less consensus regarding the interpretation
of Withers v. Teachers' Retirement System, 186 in which the beneficiaries
of a municipal pension fund challenged the propriety of the fund's
trustees' decision to buy highly speculative city bonds as part of a
plan to help the city avoid bankruptcy. 8 7 Like many public em-
ployee pension plans, this municipal plan was not fully funded, and
its most significant asset was the city's contractual liability to pay
benefits from future tax revenues. 88 The fund's trustees testified
that in the event of bankruptcy, city payments to the pension fund
would probably cease because other obligations would assume pri-
ority.18 9 The purchase of bonds was therefore made in conjunction
with several other municipal employee funds. 190 The city bonds
were so risky, however, that their purchase would not have met
traditional standards of prudence.' 9' In addition, the size of the
purchase at $2.53 billion was so substantial as to violate normal di-
versification principles. 192
making criteria with traditional efficiency-based investing methods that require investment
decisions to be made solely on basis of risk, return, diversification, and protection considera-
tions). This kind of social investment is quite similar to current proposals to limit investments
to unionized firms. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text (discussing targeted invest-
ment of union pension funds).
182. Blankenship, 329 F. Supp. at 1113.
183. Id. at 1106.
184. Id. at 1112.
185. See Ronald B. Ravikoff & Myron P. Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and
the Prudent Man Rule, 68 CAL. L. REV. 518, 521 (1980) (conceding that Blankenship indicates
trustees "may not pursue nontraditional objectives to the detriment of traditional investment
goals"). In spite of this observation, Ravikoff and Curzan argue that existing case law can be
interpreted to permit SRI and that the prudent person rule also gives trustees some latitude
in this respect. Id. at 546.
186. 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
187. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
aft'd, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
188. Id. at 1251.
189. Id. at 1252.
190. Id. at 1250.
191. Id. at 1255 (finding that extremely low bond rating and general unmarketability
would have made purchase fall outside scope of prudent investment strategy).
192. Id. at 1250, 1255.
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Plaintiff retirees argued that by taking into account the city's
threatened bankruptcy, the trustees had violated their duty of exclu-
sive loyalty to the pension plan's beneficiaries.' 93 The court re-
jected the argument that the trustees' objective was to come to the
rescue of the city.' 94 The court distinguished Blankenship by stating
that the trustees' investment policies in that case incidentally aided
pension beneficiaries through job creation, whereas the sole consid-
eration of the trustees in Withers was preservation of the pension
fund assets.' 95 The court emphasized that pursuant to statute the
city played a crucial role as the ultimate guarantor of the payment of
pension benefits to fund participants.' 96
Some have interpreted Withers as standing for the proposition that
a fiduciary may compromise the prudent person rule under certain
circumstances.' 97 Others, notably Professor Langbein, take the po-
sition that the purchase in Withers was "justifiable under the tradi-
tional wealth-maximizing standards of trust-investment law." 198
What seems clear is that the court in Withers expressly approved of
Blankenship and did not see its decision as undermining that opinion
in any way.' 99
In trying to assess the legality of SRI, it is useful to examine the
Federal Government's treatment of the issue as well as that of the
courts. For example, Ian Lanoff, former administrator of the Office
of Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs in the Department of La-
bor under the Carter administration, has taken the position that
"economic considerations are the only ones which can be taken into
account in determining which investments are consistent with ER-
ISA standards." 200 This means that in the view of the Department
of Labor, the ERISA prudence standard requires a fiduciary to make
investment decisions based on economic and financial merit rather
than on social issues such as promotion ofjob security for the fund's
193. Id at 1255.
194. Id. at 1256.
195. Id.
196. Id
197. See BRUYN, supra note 2, at 9 (citing Withers for proposition that nontraditional invest-
ment decisions are acceptable as long as they do not involve self-dealing by fiduciaries);
Ravikoff & Curzan, supra note 185, at 523 (finding that Withers permits sacrifice of traditional
investment goals of adequate return and trust corpus safety only if parties receive "other
benefits").
198. Langbein, supra note 3, at 19.
199. See Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(distinguishing Blankenship because aid to pension beneficiaries in that case was primary rather
than incidental investment goal), aft'd, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
200. Ian D. Lanoff, The Social Investment of Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be Done Lawfully
Under ERISA?, 31 LAB. LJ. 387, 392 (1980).
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* participants. 20 1 Otherwise, fiduciaries risk violating their duties of
care and loyalty that are implicit in the ERISA standards. 20 2 La-
noff's strict interpretation of the duty of loyalty and the prudence
rule does not completely foreclose all social investing, however. He
concedes that "ERISA provides sufficient flexibility to permit con-
sideration of incidental features of investments which are equal in
economic terms."
203
The notion that SRI is permitted only as an incidental feature of
otherwise traditional investment considerations suggests that SRI is
legal only when practiced in its mildest forms. This means that
screens operated in such a way as to exclude large numbers of com-
panies or even entire industries, probably run afoul of the prudence
rule20 4 and possibly of the diversification requirements of ERISA as
well.205 In addition, funds that make positive investment choices
based solely on social and political criteria, such as the existence of
equal employment opportunity programs or a unionized workforce,
are also likely to violate the fiduciary standards of ERISA. 206 The
reality is that if SRI is permitted under any circumstances, as it is, it
may only be practiced without fear of liability when the screens,
whether positive or negative, have a de minimus effect on the per-
formance of an investment portfolio.
Pension fund monies are simply not regulated in such a way as to
permit the trade-off that certain SRI investors apparently wish to
make: the exchange of future retirement income security for cur-
rent benefits. It does not matter whether the current benefits take
the form of wages, jobs, or personal satisfaction that comes from
taking a political stand. While some of the opposition to SRI ap-
pears to come from those whose primary agenda is at political odds
with much of the left-leaning social investing community, 20 7 this
cannot be said of all SRI critics. 208 In addition, ethical investors, in
201. Id. at 389.
202. Id. at 389, 391.
203. Id. at 392; see also Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586 (11 th Cir. 1986) (finding that trust-
ees who made loans to plan participants below prevailing interest rate did not violate ERISA,
which specifies that loans must be made at reasonable rates).
204. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (noting that ERISA prudence rule re-
quires fiduciary to consider capital gain and loss as well as probable investment income, diver-
sification, and liquidity when making investment decisions).
205. See 29 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(1)(C) (1988) (requiring diversification of investments in or-
der to spread risk and providing limited exception for circumstances under which it is "clearly
prudent not to do so").
206. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text (discussing general fiduciary standards
of ERISA).
207. See infra notes 212-35 and accompanying text (discussing opposition to SRI arising
from fear that investment decisions will become politicized).
208. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Teper, The Cost of Sodal Criteria: Investors Should Weigh a Program's
Expense, Benefit, PENSIONS & INVsTMENTS, May 13, 1991, at 34 (arguing that institutions com-
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part because of an inability to define their activities with precision,
must concede that Blankenship-type schemes properly belong in the
category of alternative investing strategies. 209
The fiduciary rules incorporated into ERISA were drafted partly
in response to extensive testimony about union and employer
abuses such as the inclusion in investment decisionmaking of non-
traditional criteria that resulted in arrangements placing the pen-
sion monies of employees at substantial risk. 210 Theoretically, it is
not possible to distinguish the kind of self-dealing exemplified in
Blankenship from, for example, the choice to invest in environmen-
tally friendly companies made by pension fund trustees. In each
instance, the relative economic merits of the investment are over-
shadowed by some other concern. As a result, ERISA is read to pro-
hibit all but the mildest forms of social investment because the
different forms of investment are indistinguishable.
Should the practice of SRI in the 1990s lead to an increased inci-
dence of dramatic losses such as those of the Kansas backyard in-
mitted to investing on basis of social criteria must be aware of risks and costs incumbent in
using these criteria to inform investment decisions, and noting that institutions that do not
take such factors into account may be investing irresponsibly).
209. See MILLER, supra note 3, at 31 (commenting that alternative investing is investment
in companies deemed to be promoting valued social goals).
210. For example, in the 1960s, the F.W. Woolworth Co. pension plan was heavily in-
vested in real property. Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study: Hearings on S.2 Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 727 (1971) (testimony of Robert G. Zimmerman, assis-
tant secretary and assistant treasurer, F.W. Woolworth Co.). In fact, 26.72% of the plan was
invested in real estate previously owned by Woolworth and in mortgages on property owned
at the time by Woolworth. lId The value of the properties purchased from Woolworth by the
trust pension plan was returned to the plan in monthly leases with Woolworth. Id. at 728.
The mortgages on properties owned by Woolworth, and on which the plan granted a mort-
gage, had terms scheduling payment over 25 years. Id. at 728. One Senator commented:
I take it if Woolworth were to collapse.., the fund would then be in a position of
having tenants on all the real estate it owns simultaneously being unable to make
further payments.... You would have 26 percent of your assets which in an instant
became not income producing and up for sale, in a distress condition.
Id at 729 (statement of Sen. Cummings).
In a similar situation, a pension plan of a medium-sized manufacturing company had
amassed more than $10 million in funds and had invested more than 99% of the fund in the
employer's own stock. Private Welfare and Pension Plan Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 16462,
1046, and 1045 Before the House Subcomm. on Labor, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 594 (1970) (state-
ment of I.W. Abel, president, United Steelworkers of America). Additionally, the trustees of
the fund, who were officers of the company, had been borrowing money to purchase the
stock. Id.
In another example, the retirement fund of Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., held the following mix
of assets: 41% bonds, 37% common stocks, 20% rental properties, and 2% mortgages. See
Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study: Hearings on S. 2 Before the Subcomm. on Labor, 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 862, 867 (1971) (testimony ofjames Cameron, vice chairman, profit sharing commit-
tee, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.) (testifying that "common stock of Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., rental
properties under lease to Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., or its subsidiaries, and loans secured by
mortgages on properties under lease to Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc." comprised 28% of com-
pany's retirement fund).
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vestment program in the 1980s, 211 courts may have to directly
confront the question whether there are any circumstances under
which a fund may engage in pure ethical investing. At the moment,
and with the events in Kansas in mind, the exclusion of all but inci-
dental consideration for noneconomic criteria seems reasonable.
III. LIVING wrTH SRI AS AN INCIDENTAL CONSIDERATION
Socially responsible investment is less-than-optimal investment.
If it were optimal, we would all be doing it anyway.
212
[T]he issue of "social responsibility" has more and more come to
be seen as one in which a trade-off is involved... between acting
responsibly and acting profitably .... In fact, because of several
profound economic changes in the past few years, social responsi-
bility and profitability may now be more compatible than ever
before.213
Those who oppose SRI seem to do so because they are concerned
by the opportunity for self-dealing, as exemplified in Blankenship,
or because they are strongly opposed to politicizing investment
decisions.2 14 On the other hand, supporters of ethical investing are
generally of the opinion that politics are properly injected into in-
vestment decisions when there is no resulting cost. 215 When SRI is
costly, meaning that it results in a lower rate of return, there is less
consensus among supporters over its propriety. As explained
above, ERISA neither permits 216 nor prohibits21 7 all forms of SRI.
However, two questions remain: what circumstances will satisfy the
"incidental consideration" that ERISA appears to permit those in-
clined to participate in SRI?218 And, should ERISA be amended to
211. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text (discussing significant losses in Kansas
Public Employees Retirement System pension fund investments).
212. SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Alastair Morton, former chief executive of Guin-
ness Peat group in United Kingdom and presently chair of Eurotunnel).
213. RICHARD PARKER & TASMIN TAYLOR, STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS: AN ALTERNATIVE FOR
PUBLIC FUNDS 2 (1979) (emphasis deleted).
214. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 3, at 9-12 (finding that SRI subjects pension trustees to
political demands because investment of that type is "intrinsically standardless"). Langbein
also criticizes the use of union pension funds to create jobs because this "violates the primary
policies of pension law" by sacrificing retirement income of plan beneficiaries through invest-
ment in economically less attractive investments. Id. at 11-12.
215. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 151, at 208-09 (stating that socially responsible invest-
ments should be encouraged as matter of policy if they do not increase risk or decrease trust
income).
216. See supra notes 204-06, 210 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA prohibition on
social investment except as incidental consideration).
217. See Lanoff, supra note 200, at 390 (concluding that ERISA prudence standard permits
consideration of social implications after determination that potential investments are equally
economically viable); see also supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA
fiduciary standards).
218. See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text (noting that incidental consideration
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explicitly permit trustees to engage in more aggressive SRI at the
expense of plan beneficiaries' future pension benefits?
A. Inconsequential SRI
The "incidental consideration" standard, if it can be treated as
such, has two obvious drawbacks, one theoretical and the other
practical. The theoretical problem is that giving a small amount of
consideration to noneconomic criteria, or opting for SRI only when
it involves no sacrifices to the portfolio in terms of risk or return, is
the capital market equivalent of being a "little bit pregnant." It is
not hard to imagine two investment choices that offer the same re-
turn, with one being a traditional investment and the other an ethi-
cal investment. It is also not hard to imagine two investment
choices, one for the ethical investor and the other for the traditional
investor, that appear to be equally risky. The difficulty lies in imag-
ining two such choices, one for the SRI adherent and one for the
traditionalist, that simultaneously present the same risk/return
profile.219
Suppose, however, that two such investments could be found. Is
this the moment for the kind of incidental consideration that ERISA
permits? Perhaps, except that under these circumstances it will be
difficult to determine who is practicing SRI and who is motivated by
traditional considerations. This distinction will not really matter,
however, because whatever differentiates the ethical investment
from the unethical one is evidently not significant enough to affect
the efficient market's assessment of the investments' attractiveness.
In any event, there will probably be few instances in which the only
characteristic distinguishing two investments is that one satisfies a
particular set of political or social criteria and the other does not.22 0
The practical problems with implementing the incidental consid-
eration standard arise in the more numerous cases in which a dis-
tinction of the type just mentioned is small but measurable. For
example, in Brock v. Walton,22' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit determined that pension plan trustees did
not violate ERISA when they charged interest rates below the pre-
standard means that SRI is only permitted as incidental feature of otherwise traditional invest-
ment considerations).
219. Keep in mind that traditional investors are not "unethical," but are better described
as "apolitical." These investors will pursue an investment that would also attract a socially
responsible investor if it is otherwise economically satisfactory.
220. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (stating that no two investments are identi-
cal when evaluated in terms of profit potential, risk, and diversification).
221. 794 F.2d 586 (1 lth Cir. 1986).
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vailing market rate on loans to plan participants. 222 ERISA gener-
ally prohibits plans from making mortgage loans to participants
unless they bear a reasonable rate of interest. 223 In this instance,
the plan lent the mortgage funds at two and one-eighth points be-
low the prevailing market rate.224 The court noted that "reason-
able" interest and "market" interest are not synonymous, 225 and
stated that the rate charged was not so low as to be completely un-
justified, nor was it violative of ERISA's prudence standard.226 Ad-
ditionally, the court in Brock affirmed the district court's finding that
ERISA's exclusive purpose standard is not violated when "a party
other than a plan's participants and beneficiaries" benefits from a
transaction with the plan.
227
Thus, while small deviations from the exclusive purpose standard
and the single-minded pursuit of financial return at an acceptable
level of risk are clearly permitted, it is hard to say how large this
universe of nearly equal investment choices is. The incidental con-
sideration standard provides no guide as to how wide the gap be-
tween the reasonable return on an SRI investment and market
return may be before ERISA is offended.
B. Proposals for Permitting More Aggressive SRI
This Article has considered the practice of SRI under two circum-
stances: first, in the instance in which competing investments are
equal, in the sense that they both fall on the efficiency frontier,228
and second, in the instance in which competing investments are
nearly equal. 229 ERISA permits the consideration of noneconomic
factors in either of these two cases. 230 There is no reason to believe
that there will be many times in which two investments can be said
to be equal, however. The size of the pool of nearly equal invest-
ments will depend entirely on how much deviation from market
standards is permitted.
222. Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586, 588 (11th Cir. 1986).
223. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(1)(B), 1108(b)(1) (1988) (codifying ERISA §§ 406(a)(1)(B),
408(b)(1)).
224. Brock, 794 F.2d at 587.
225. Id.
226. Id
227. Ia at 586, aff'g Donovan v. Walton, 609 F. Supp. 1221, 1245 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
228. Seesupra note 75 and accompanying text (defining efficiency frontier as state of inves-
tor who has maximized income by holding diversified portfolio that eliminates risk).
229. See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text (discussing investment of fund assets
at slightly below market rate of interest).
230. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (noting that ERISA provides sufficient flex-
ibility to permit consideration of some noneconomic factors when making investment
decisions).
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A third class of situations exists that may well encompass most of
the choices faced by ardent ethical investors. This third group con-
sists of choices that, in an efficient market, are expected to involve
significant costs in terms of either risk or return to the ethical inves-
tor. ERISA clearly does not permit this kind of investing, although
there is reason to believe that it nonetheless takes place.23 1 An issue
to consider is whether ERISA should be amended to allow aggres-
sive SRI, and if so, under what circumstances this type of SRI should
be permitted.
In considering the feasibility of allowing participants to opt for a
socially responsible investment portfolio, Professors Langbein and
Posner have suggested that if beneficiaries are informed of the in-
creased risks and costs of such a portfolio, the investment scheme
might satisfy ERISA.23 2 The rationale behind this cautious proposal
appears to be that the investment plan would "lack that element of
involuntary imposition on the beneficiary" that ERISA seeks to
avoid and that ethical investing of pension funds invariably involves
due to the funds' collective nature.23 3 The dissonance between
trustees and participants is really an agency cost problem, 23 4 and
opt-out procedures seem a sensible way to address the problem.
Another possibility is that in a defined contribution plan, aggres-
sive SRI may be permissible with or without the consent and knowl-
edge of the beneficiaries where the expected return on an ethical
investment equals that of a competing traditional investment and
the ethical investment is independently insured by the fund for the
added risk.35 Requiring social investors of pension assets to obtain
231. See supra note 136-39 and accompanying text (discussing Kansas pension fund
situation).
232. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 2, at 104-07 (finding ratification model of SRI,
which informs beneficiaries of risks and costs of investments and allows them to opt into plan,
to be feasible in pension context having low administrative costs, so long as investment crite-
ria are precisely defined).
233. Langbein & Posner, supra note 2, at 106. Langbein and Posner describe SRI as "eco-
nomically sound because the consumption benefits of social investing... are, in economic
analysis, as real as investment benefits." Id. at 107.
234. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305, 308-10 (1976) (discussing
agency cost theory). Agency costs arise in any agency relationship because agents and princi-
pals have an inherent conflict of interest. Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of
Private Goods, 37 EMORy LJ. 295, 315 (1988). "Agents have incentives to shirk and to divert
the resources of the [trust] toward their own ends, while the principals, due to collective ac-
tion and free rider problems, often find it costly to curtail such conduct." Id. Agency costs
are especially high in a trust relationship because "the objectives of the trust are not as clearly
specified as those of [a] corporation [that] exists as a contractually created legal entity whose
purpose is to maximize profits." Id. at 315-16. Because trust objectives are more varied,
developing legal standards to monitor trustees and lower agency costs is more difficult. Id. at
316.
235. Cf. supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text (discussing low-income apartment re-
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insurance would satisfy those concerned with SRI's increased non-
systematic risk and the likelihood of further demands on the already
beleaguered Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 23 6 It would
also, however, add to the cost of social investing.
When the expected return on an ethical investment is lower than
that of a traditional investment, obtaining the express consent of the
participants appears to be the only sensible mechanism available to
avoid pension plan disputes. In effect, obtaining consent permits
participants to "purchase" the current satisfaction that comes from
SRI with future pension benefits.
As for defined benefit plans, it is hard to imagine why an em-
ployer, who bears the risk if the investments do not perform as ex-
pected, would want to assume additional costs in order to satisfy the
consumption desires of its employees. There is no obvious reason
to prohibit SRI, however, when the expected return is comparable
to other investment choices and the increased risk is compensated
through the purchase of insurance.
CONCLUSION
The debate over ethical investing should be about the kinds of
choices available to plan participants as they try to reconcile their
politics with a desire to create and preserve capital for retirement.
Of course, such a debate properly takes into account the fact that
measures leading to a decrease in private pension accumulations
will likely affect Social Security and other potential sources of in-
come for the elderly. Supporters of SRI have therefore done a dis-
service to the debate by insisting that SRI is essentially costless
without explaining that only under the inefficient markets theory
could this be true. This Article has shown that we should expect
SRI to lead to increased costs and lower returns or alternatively to
higher nonsystematic risk in an efficient market.23 7 Indeed, the
more aggressively SRI is practiced, the more one would expect ethi-
cal investing to be economically unattractive.
238
habilitation investments undertaken by New York City, which appear to exemplify this
mechanism).
236. See, e.g., David T. Cook, Squeeze Goes on at Pension Guarantee Agency, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 6, 1983, at B3 (describing financial problems of Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation); Douglas Frantz & Robert A. Rosenblatt, Unhealthy Pension Plans Pose Gamble for
Workers, L.A. TImEs, Nov. 13, 1989, at Al (outlining risks accompanying underfunded pension
plans); Nancy L. Ross, Pension Payment Deferment Requests Rise, WASH. PosT, July 6, 1982, at D7
(reporting on numbers of companies that cannot make payments under pension plans).
237. See supra notes 78-80 (suggesting that under capital asset pricing model SRI results in
greater nonsystematic risk).
238. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (concluding that SRI prevents investors
from achieving efficient portfolio of investments).
1992]
50 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Even on an intuitive level, this result is not surprising, because if
SRI were truly costless, one would expect to see a great many SRI
practitioners. 23 9 And if SRI were costless, the only points of conten-
tion would be the propriety of particular screens and competing eth-
ical views. In fact, concern that it is theoretically impossible to
distinguish the search for "green" companies, for example, from the
pro-union activities condemned in Blankenship, generates much of
the criticism of SRI.
This does not mean that ethical investing should be prohibited
under all circumstances. ERISA does not require this, 240 and com-
mon sense and basic fairness suggest the contrary. Individuals
should not be forced to make investments they find morally unac-
ceptable. SRI practiced by the individual investor does not raise this
concern. In the pension context, however, one cannot avoid the
agency cost problem by presuming knowledge or consent of plan
participants to any social or political agenda of plan trustees.2 41
The stakes-future retirement income-are high and the opportuni-
ties for abuse seem limitless, so some constraints are needed.
Yet, ERISA's current inconsequential standard 242 is overly restric-
tive. When a plan provides a mechanism for informing participants
of expected additional costs and/or added risk, it is hard to justify
limiting SRI to choices nearly comparable to traditional invest-
ments. Alternatively, when a plan includes insurance against added
risk as the price it pays to secure a return competitive with other
investments, there is likewise no reason to prohibit ethical investing.
Supporters of SRI appear to have ignored the strongest source of
theoretical support for the oft-heard proposition that SRI is cost-
free. Significantly, the SRI critique developed by Professors
Langbein and Posner assumes that capital markets are efficient and
that the CAPM remains unchallenged. 243 These assumptions are
not true, however. Evidence now reveals that capital markets are
not always efficient. 244 Accordingly, the separation theorem does
239. Many supporters of SRI object to this conclusion and point out that an investor
might, for example, be a racist who approves of and wants to support the South African
apartheid government. Acting on these views in the creation of a portfolio, however, would
be just another form of ethical investing. In economic terms, the traditionalist is simply
nonpolitical, not immoral or politically conservative.
240. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text (concluding that ERISA allows SRI in
its mildest forms).
241. See supra note 234 (discussing agency costs in trust context).
242. See supra notes 200-03 (noting that Federal Government has concluded that ERISA
permits SRI as "incidental consideration" of traditional investments).
243. Langbein & Posner, supra note 2, at 76.
244. See supra notes 92-113 and accompanying text (providing empirical and theoretical
evidence supporting inefficiency market hypothesis).
[Vol. 42:1
1992] SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 51
not apply, and SRI could in fact be an income maximizing strategy.
In other words, in an inefficient market, a social investor may maxi-
mize income by following various speculative booms, in spite of the
fact that a traditionalist would view this choice as being behind the
efficiency frontier. 245 Therefore, non-CAPM strategies such as SRI
may succeed where traditional approaches fail.246 Alternatively, the
fact that certain screens are superior proxies for ascertaining infor-
mation useful to all investors may account for the instances in which
SRI funds outperform the market. For example, the search for
"green" companies may actually be a search for especially well-man-
aged companies.
The mounting evidence in favor of the inefficiency hypothesis un-
questionably bolsters the case for SRI. Nonetheless, backyard in-
vestment schemes of the Kansas variety are undoubtedly illegal
under ERISA and ought to remain so. The diversification principle
remains valid, however, and there is no evidence that backyard
schemes are so hostile to this principle that they warrant an explicit
ban.
Socially responsible investing has existed for a long time and is
being practiced by a sufficiently broad variety of plans that its impact
cannot be ignored. For example, although it is difficult to gauge the
precise impact of various investments, institutional and individual
investors' widespread refusal to maintain economic ties with the
apartheid regime in South Africa has dearly played a role in the
changes taking place in that nation.247 Although some political
changes remain elusive and the future is by no means certain, these
investors helped to create a climate in South Africa that was condu-
cive to reform. 248 The same can probably be said of other ethical
investing campaigns. Rather than destroying SRI, frank acknowl-
edgement of its expected costs and risks in an efficient market
245. See Richard A. Booth, The Emerging Conflict Between Federal Securities Law and State Corpo-
ration Law, 12J. CORP. L. 73, 88 (1986) (stating that investing on basis of "hunches" based on
noneconomic factors may cause substantial changes in stock prices and therefore constitute
rational, profit-seeking investment strategy); see also supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text
(discussing SRI in terms of efficiency frontier).
246. See supra Tables 1, 2 accompanying notes 117-19 (presenting tabulated evidence that
some social investment funds outperformed market average, DowJones Industrials, and S & P
500); see also supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (discussing efficient markets hypothesis
and finding that superior performance of SRI supports inefficiency hypothesis).
247. See supra notes 6-7 (describing internal social and political changes in South Africa
and lifting of economic sanctions by international community).
248. See, e.g., Chris Black, Divestment Debate Rekindled: Apartheid Foes Say Pressure Must Be
Kept on South Africa, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 1990, at A21 ("'People inside South Africa, black
and white, were the major force [behind ending apartheid]. But they would be the first to say
the external boycott was very important.' Indeed, [National Publicity Secretary for the United
Democratic Front] Lekota characterized the role of external economic pressure as 'crucial'
.... ) (quoting Robert Zevin, economist and senior vice president, US Trust Co.).
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should enhance SRI's attractiveness to pension plan participants
and their beneficiaries. In addition, the inefficiency hypothesis only
supports the longstanding contention of SRI aficionados that profit-
able investment can take place behind the efficiency frontier.
